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1. Introduction 
When power industries around the world have been restructured (generally involving the 
introduction of competition into the industry), investment in demand-side management (DSM) has 
declined considerably. The South African electricity industry now lies on the brink of considerable 
restructuring and, following international trends, it appears likely that local DSM programmes and 
plans will also be threatened. Foreseeing this, the Energy and Development Research Centre began, 
in mid-1999, to undertake research, analysis and advocacy work on 'The implications of power 
sector restructuring on investment in demand side management in South Africa'. The key objective 
of this project was to find, and then recommend, ways of protecting DSM in changing power sector 
contexts. This would be done through investigating how other countries have sought to protect 
investment in energy efficiency, understanding better the potential implications of power sector 
reform for investment in energy efficiency, alerting policy makers and programme implementers to 
any dangers, and working with these stakeholders to develop reasonable policies, programmes and 
plans to support energy-efficiency investment in changing contexts. 
This research project has comprised various different outputs and activities. Firstly. we undertook a 
review and analysis of the impact that power sector restructuring has had on investments in DSM in 
selected countries around the world (namely, United States, New Zealand, England and Wales. 
Norway, Chile and Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, and Ghana). This review also investigated how these 
different countries have (or have not) supported investment in public benefit energy efficiency as 
more competition has been introduced into power industries. Secondly, we investigated barriers 
inhibiting investment in DSM in South Africa. We undertook this analysis from the perspectives of 
utilities' residential, commercial and industrial customers, Eskom, municipal distributors, and 
government. Thereafter, we undertook a scenario analysis to get a sense of what might happen to 
DSM investment as the power industry in South Africa was reformed. We looked at DSM investment 
in the context of the structure and ownership patterns of (i) the current structure of the power 
industry; (ii) when the electricity distribution industry (ED!) has been rationalised into a small 
number of regional electricity distributors (REDs), (iii) when competition has been introduced into 
the wholesale electricity market; and (iv) when retail competition is in effect. This report comprises 
the fourth, and last, research output for this project. It makes recommendations to the government, 
the National Electricity Regulator (NER), Eskom, and municipal distributors on how to ensure that 
public benefit energy-efficiency investment is well placed in new power sector contexts in South 
Africa. 
To get to the point of being able to make these recommendations, we have undertaken various 
activities. Firstly, as noted, we investigated the barriers inhibiting investment in energy efficiency in 
South Africa. Secondly, we looked at what might happen to these barriers as more competition was 
progressively introduced into the power industry in South Africa. We noted that some of these 
barriers could be reduced or removed by power sector restructuring, while others could not. We also 
noted that reform would bring about new market barriers. 1 We chose to focus on the barriers that 
could be addressed, or would be introduced, by power sector restructuring. This is not to say that we 
do not see barriers that would be largely unaffected by power sector restructuring as being 
unimportant. Indeed, many of these barriers (for example, customer unwillingness to adopt new and 
efficient technologies or inability to afford these technologies and changed behaviours, poor 
economic conditions, scarcity of specialised skills to implement DSM programmes, etc) are the most 
concerning of all. The objective of our work, however, is to develop an 'in-depth understanding of 
the impacts power sector restructuring could have on investment in DSM, and then to make 
recommendations to ensure that this investment not only continues to occur, but also grows in 
magnitude'. 
Thirdly, we held a workshop to disseminate results of our research, to receive comment on it, and to 
initiate broader industry debate in this area, inviting a wide range of electricity industry policymakers 
and stakeholders including those from the NER, Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) and 
other government departments, local distributors, Eskom, government departments, research 
organisations, electricity intensive users group and local government associations. 
See Clark & Barberton (1999). 
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Fourthly, we have spent time -in some instances, extensive time- with staff of Eskom, DME and 
the NER discussing policies, programmes and activities to remove, or at least reduce, these barriers. 
For the most, we presented preliminary recommendations and asked for responses from these 
institutions. We noted these responses, and altered, refined or added to the recommendations where 
relevant. Finally, we drafted this report. We will take this report to the stakeholders who contributed 
to it, as well as to others. In doing so, we would hope to continue to provide momentum and 
substance to the debate on whether and/or how public benefit energy-efficiency investment should 
be protected as the distribution industry is rationalised, and as more competition is introduced into 
South Africa's power sector. 
The recommendations presented in this document vary in nature. We have sought to suggest policy 
positions or roles government, the NER, Eskom and municipal distributors might assume with regard 
to energy efficiency. We also make recommendations on appropriate governance and institutional 
arrangements, as well as operational and financing mechanisms that would protect this public 
benefit. These recommendations are made where appropriate: it seems, for example, more relevant 
to focus suggestions on amended organisational structure for the DME vis-a-vis energy efficiency 
than on financing arrangements. Likewise, in presenting recommendations to the NER, it seems 
relevant to place emphasis on financing mechanisms for energy-efficiency investment rather than on 
altering the internal organisational structure of the NER. 
2. A 'public benefit' energy-efficiency investment focus 
In undertaking an international review of the impact that power sector restructuring has had on 
investment in DSM, as well as the measures that some countries have adopted to ensure the survival 
of this type of investment, it became clear early on in the research that, for the purposes of making 
sound recommendations, it is necessary to differentiate between the various types of DSM. These 
types of DSM can be grouped into two different categories: DSM investments that are in the utilities' 
financial interests to undertake and those which are not. Generally, load management initiatives 
such as load-shifting, interruptibility, strategic growth, and a relatively small amount of energy-
efficiency investments fit well within the former category - i.e. DSM investments that contribute 
positively to the bottom-line of the utility. 'Other' energy-efficiency investments fall within the second 
category. 
DSM options that utilities invest in to improve 
financial performance 
lnterruptibility Load shifting 
~ 
Strategic growth Energy efficiency 
A A 
A DSM option that 'falls through the gap' 
because such investment does not necessarily 
improve utility financial performance 
Energy efficiency 
A 
Figure 1: DSM options 
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Targeted generally at large and sometimes small industrial and commercial users of power (and 
sometimes residential customers), the first category of load-management-type DSM initiatives 
generally attract investment funds when such investments contribute to the bottom-line of the utility 
and/or help to improve utilities' service to customers. The benefit to the utility is generally derived 
from the fact that the need for new capacity and/or network investments is deferred. Customers 
benefit from favourable tariff packages, reduced energy bills and direct interface with the utility. This 
win-win situation therefore motivates utilities to remove, or at least reduce, the barriers inhibiting 
customer participation in these types of DSM programmes. 
Our international review has indicated that DSM initiatives in the first category have not been as 
affected by restructuring processes as have the second category of energy efficiency type DSM 
programmes. Programmes in this second category involve training and education activities, 
information and awareness campaigns, demonstrations and audits, and direct installation 
programmes targeted mainly at small industrial and commercial customers as well as at the 
residential sector. These types of investments involve a more complex investment decision for 
utilities. In general, as competitive pressures have been introduced into countries' electricity sectors, 
investment in this type of DSM has declined significantly. Reluctance to allocate resources to this 
type of energy-efficiency programme has occurred because restructuring generally seeks to harness 
competitive forces to improve the economic efficiency of the system. Achieving this goal makes it 
more difficult for players in the industry to invest in these types of energy-efficiency programmes and 
remain price-competitive (Swisher 1994). 
Here, one of the biggest barriers to the implementation of this type of energy-efficiency investment is 
the barrier existing within the utility itself. Because energy efficiency implies a decrease in a utility's 
total kWh sales, it is not in a utility's best interest to develop programmes in this area (unless, as 
noted, it pays a utility to do so). This disincentive exists before and after restructuring. It is 
particularly prevalent subsequent to restructuring because of competitive pressures). Prior to 
restructuring, utilities are generally more prepared to invest in energy-efficiency programmes 
because of (a) the institutional links between generation, transmission and distribution; and (b) a 
natural monopoly status that enables or encourages some degree of public benefit social investment. 
To summarise, when developing an understanding of the prospects for DSM investment in changing 
markets in order to propose mechanisms to protect this investment, it is important to define precisely 
what type of investment is being proposed for promotion and protection. The remainder of this 
report focuses on the second category of energy-efficiency investment which, as noted, targets 
smaller industrial and commercial customers, as well as residential households. In essence, this type 
of investment is that which easily 'falls between the gaps', particularly so when broader industry 
restructuring initiatives are introduced, or even just proposed. Furthermore, this report focuses on 
investments traditionally made by utilities, and those which utilities in changing markets, and energy 
service companies (or ESCOs), cannot easily justify taking responsibility for. Hereafter, this type of 
investment will be referred to as 'public benefit energy-efficiency investment.' 
3. Rationale for promoting public benefit energy-
efficiency investment 
Many government departments, regulatory authorities and distributor utilities around the world have 
undertaken, in one way or another, to invest in public benefit energy-efficiency programmes. 
Recently, we undertook a review of this, and noted the following rationale for these initiatives. 
• Governments and regulators have sought to protect the interests of power sector customers. 
Governments and regulators in, for example, England and Wales, Norway, New Zealand, United 
States and South Africa have created conditions that enable household and business customers 
to make the best investment decisions around energy usage, and thus to reduce costs associated 
with such energy usage. Regulators are frequently required to carry out this responsibility, albeit 
in conflict with other regulatory responsibilities, most notably keeping energy prices low. 
• Governments and regulators are committed to achieving energy-environmental policy goals. 
With perhaps the exception of Argentina and Chile, most of the countries reviewed under this 
study have promoted energy-efficiency investment because such investment is seen to contribute 
substantially towards national sustainable development goals. 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
Promoting public benefit energy-efficiency investment in new power context 4 
• Governments are committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Governments committed 
under the Rio Declaration (1992) to substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have 
sought to promote energy-efficiency investment. As examples: The Office of the Electricity 
Regulator (formerly Offer and now Ofgas) in the United Kingdom retained the services of the 
Energy Savings Trust - which was initially established as a means of meeting the UK's 
obligations under the Rio Declaration - to promote energy-efficiency investment. The primary 
objective of New Zealand's Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority is to 'achieve 
governmental energy and environmental policy goals, particularly with respect to C02 emission 
reductions'. One of the two primary objectives of South Africa's Efficient Lighting Initiative is to 
contribute towards a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
• With growing capacity constraints, governments and utilities encourage energy-efficiency 
programmes that will contribute towards reducing the need for new power sector investments. In 
most of the developing countries that this review studied, energy-efficiency programmes have 
been seen as a means towards managing power sector capacity constraints. The government of 
Brazil, for example, established PROCEL to fund or co-fund conservation projects carried out by 
state and local utilities, universities, state agencies, private companies and research institutes. In 
South Africa, Eskom funds various DSM programmes, the main objective of which is to defer the 
decision to invest in new capacity. Similarly, peak savings are the objective of energy-efficiency 
programmes in Thailand and Ghana. 
• Investment in energy efficiency is seen to make a real contribution to the economy. In some 
countries reviewed, energy-efficiency investment is promoted because of a wide acceptance that 
it makes a rea/ financial/economic contribution. That energy-efficiency investment results in win-
win situations for customers and implementors is undisputed, and well-known. In such instances, 
energy-efficiency investment is often undertaken as a component of an integrated resource 
planning (IRP) framework (in particular, Norway and the United States). Here, regulators require 
planning based on principles of IRP planning to ensure that the best, most robust investment 
decisions are made. 
• Utilities invest in energy-efficiency programmes because they contribute towards customer 
retention/expansion programmes as well as bene/ii from improved customer service. As noted, 
distributor utilities become loath to invest in public purpose energy-efficiency programmes as 
competition is introduced into the power sector. Indeed, it is rare in these contexts for utilities to 
invest in this area of their own accord. When they do, however, it is mainly for other reasons, 
including adding value to their service to customers in order to either improve customer service 
or to retain and grow market base. 
International energy policy literature illustrates numerous examples of how energy efficiency is in 
fact often the least-cost way to provide energy services, while at the same time reducing 
environmental impacts of energy use (for example, Lovins & Lovins 1991; Reddy & Goldemberg 
1990; Gadgil & Jannuzzi 1991; Kats 1991; Krause & Eto 1988). In other words, this literature cites 
examples of DSM initiatives where the social and environmental cost of helping customers to utilise 
energy more efficiently is less than the social and environmental cost of producing more electricity. 
Benefits of DSM include lower energy costs for consumers and reduced need for new power plants 
with their attendant environmental problems. 
Some analysis to assess the costs and benefits of DSM initiatives has been undertaken in South 
Africa too. Eskom's integrated electricity planning (IEP) team has undertaken a considerable amount 
of work in this area. On a far smaller scale, so too has the Energy and Development Research 
Centre. Indeed, in 1995, we embarked on a policy project entitled Energy efficiency, equity and 
environment: improving access to energy services for the urban poor in South Africa. Jointly funded 
by Eskom and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada, the primary aim 
of the project was to identify policies and strategy interventions which could improve the 
appropriateness and efficiency of energy services in a way that addresses both the energy poverty 
and the energy-related environmental problems experienced by the urban poor. An element of this 
project was to understand the economics of these policies and strategy interventions from the point 
of view of customers, Eskom Generation and the distribution industry. 
The first phase of this project comprised a background or scoping exercise, which aimed at gauging 
the international and local experience in energy efficiency, as well as the energy efficiency potential 
across all sectors of the South African economy. The second phase of the project aimed at 
determining the current energy end-use patterns in low-income urban households with a view to 
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establishing the energy needs of these households and to identifying potential areas of intetVention. 
Four areas were identified for more detailed analysis and strategy development. These were fuel-
switching, thermally efficient housing, energy-efficiency appliances and energy-efficient lighting. In 
the third phase of the project, these four areas were fo.cused on in more detail. Barriers to 
investment were identified and recommendations were put forward to overcome these barriers 
(Simmonds & Clark 1998). 
Results and recommendations of this project are summarised in Energy efficiency for the urban 
poor: economics, environmental impacts and policy implications (Spalding-Fecher et a/1999). The 
economic analysis presented in this report demonstrates the substantial economic and 
environmental benefits energy efficiency inteiVentions yield for the urban poor. The five 
intetVentions presented include three energy-efficiency programmes (compact fluorescent lamps, 
efficient refrigerators and improved thermal efficiency of low-cost housing) and two fuel-switching 
programmes (from electricity and paraffin to gas for cooking). 
From an economic perspective, four out of five of these programmes (all but the electricity to gas for 
cooking) generate substantial benefits for society. In other words, the cost to society of providing 
affordable energy setVices would be lower with the intetVentions than without them. The CFL and 
efficient refrigerator programme would also substantially reduce Eskom's cost of supplying energy 
setVices even with a substantial subsidy from Eskom for the capital costs, while the thermal efficiency 
programme would impose a very small incremental cost on Eskom. Given the current structure of 
tariffs in South Africa, however, the net income impact of the efficiency programme would be 
negative, because Eskom makes a margin on each kWh of electricity sold - so any reduction in kWh 
sales reduces net income. With a regulatory regime that would decouple sales from profits (i.e. 
basing profits on growth of customer base for instance) these could become profitable investments 
for Eskom (Spalding-Fecher et a/1999). 
Because of their high discount rates and the higher up-front costs of efficiency, consumers may not 
consider it worthwhile to invest in energy efficiency without financing for the incremental capital 
costs. The CFL and efficient refrigeration programmes, however, would break even for consumers 
with almost no subsidy. The thermal efficiency and paraffin to gas switch programmes would require 
capital subsidies of 50% and 30%, respectively. Consumers who do not participate in these 
programmes would see marginal increases in their electricity bill due to slightly higher tariffs, but this 
is more than offset by the increased disposable income for participating customers (Spalding-Fecher 
et a/1999). 
This particular project indicates clearly the social benefits associated with energy-efficiency 
programmes. Indeed, these intetVentions represent feasible ways that the energy sector can 
contribute to poverty alleviation, and broader developmental goals within South Africa. 
4. An 'enabling environment' for energy efficiency 
In this report specific recommendations to government, the NER, and the distribution industry are 
given on how to protect public benefit energy-efficiency investment. We have sought to make 
recommendations that hold true for different electricity industry contexts in South Africa, including 
for the industry (i) in its current form, (ii) when the distribution industry has been rationalised and 
REDs are in place, (iii) when there is competition in the wholesale, and (iv) retail markets. During 
the course of our work, we have found that it is less complicated to make robust recommendations 
to government than it is to the NER. Indeed, regulatory mechanisms supporting energy efficiency 
differ depending on the prevailing degree of competition in the power sector at any one time. No 
matter the structural and ownership patterns of industry, government, on the other hand, will always 
be tasked with creating (i) an enabling environment for energy-efficiency investment, and (ii) a 
prevailing culture that energy efficiency is a public good. 
As described by Barberton and Clark (1999), various barriers inhibit optimal investment in DSM and 
energy-efficiency investment in South Africa. We have taken the position in this report that 
programmes, projects, policies and strategies should be designed so as to remove or, at the very 
least, reduce these barriers. In our environment, where people, time and other resources are scarce, 
intetVentions for development must be prioritised, and must also be reasonable. In this section we 
ask: 'how can an enabling environment for public benefit energy-efficiency investment best be 
created?' 
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We are of the opinion that an enabling environment for investment in energy efficiency can be 
created on various different levels, and by different role-players. These are illustrated in Figure 2 
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· Figure 2: Creating an enabling environment for investment in energy efficiency 
J 
Through carefully designed policies, programmes and projects, government, for example. can create 
an environment which catalyses investment in energy-efficiency-related programmes and policies by 
Eskom, other local service providers, housing developers, lighting and appliance manufacturers, 
distributors and/or retailers, ESCOs and financing institutions. In tum, this investment should result 
in new or additional investment in energy efficiency, by end-users. Similarly, through an appropriate 
regulatory framework, the NER could either encourage or require local service providers to invest in 
energy efficiency projects and programmes that ultimately benefit residential customers and thus 
motivate for the adoption of efficient technologies. 
Sections 5, 6 and 7 below recommend priority enabling activities for government. the Regulator. 
and the distribution industry. These roleplayers are identified as the key 'enablers·. or those that 
have the greatest leverage to create opportunities for other players (for example. community 
organisations, financial institutions, housing developers, lighting and appliance manufacturers, 
distributors and retailers, and ESCOs) to contribute towards new investment in energy efficiency. 
It should also be noted that, because of the varying nature of the prevailing barriers inhibiting 
investment in energy efficiency, as well as the different roles key stakeholders play. levels of 
intervention to reduce these barriers or to enhance institutions ability to fulfil their role. differ. It 
could be argued, for instance, that because government does not have the monetary or other 
resources to play a strongly interventionist role in the energy services industry, it should rather seek 
to create an enabling environment that would encourage private sector participation and 
investment. Our recommendations thus focus on government playing this caretaker-type role. It 
could, however, be argued that regulation is the most powerful way of encouraging energy-
efficiency investment, and that the NER should therefore adopt a more interventionist or market-
engaging approach in this area. If so, recommendations should seek to assist the NER in fulfilling 
this role. Clearly, though, recommendations would be pitched on a significantly different level to 
those for government. Finally, Eskom and municipal distributors are (or could be) implementing 
energy-efficiency programmes (as opposed to making policy in this area). By virtue of this, 
recommendations should focus on enhancing worthwhile implementation and on skills transfer. 
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5. Recommendations to government 
Current priorities in the Energy Branch include: electrification, restructuring of the electricity supply 
industry, restructuring of the EDI, restructuring of the liquid fuels industry, new gas pipeline 
development opportunities and new legislation {Energy Bill, Gas Bill, Electricity Regulation Bill, etc). 
Given the enormousness of these issues, and the associated attention that they will undoubtedly 
require, it is unlikely from a human resource point of view that energy efficiency will receive 
adequate attention in the foreseeable future. Indeed, in May 2000, the staff complement of the 
Energy Branch of the DME was 48 {excluding support and administrative personnel). Budgetary 
constraints also severely limit the attention staff of the Energy Branch and other governmental 
departments can devote to energy efficiency. Governmental departments, for example, have not 
allocated any funds to the Environmentally Sound Low-Cost Housing Team. Thus, eve'n if members 
of this inter-departmental team do have time to dedicate to thermal efficiency issues, they are 
financially strapped from doing so. These are clearly barriers inhibiting government from creating an 
enabling environment for energy efficiency.2 
We are mindful that government faces tremendous budgetary and other capacity constraints, 3 and 
that, within these constraints, government has to identify priority activities for immediate attention. 
For these reasons, we have chosen to present recommendations that we feel take cognisance of 
these constraints. Our judgement is that it is preferable to present recommendations that are 
implementable and realistic, rather than ones that cannot be implemented because of 
insurmountable public sector constraints. Thus, while international experience has been insightful to 
this research and analysis, in that guidance on what solutions can be sought to reduce particular 
market barriers, we have also kept in mind that the solutions of industrialised - or other - countries 
might not be solutions for South Africa. 
5.1 Government's position on energy efficiency 
Government's position on energy efficiency is documented in the White Paper on Energy Policy 
{1998), which notes that '[s]ince expenditure on energy constitutes a large proportion of the 
country's GDP (15%) and a particularly large proportion of poor household's expenditure, it is 
necessary to give attention to the effective and efficient use of energy. Energy efficiency and energy 
conservation considerations must therefore form part of an overall energy policy'. A section of this 
document is dedicated to energy efficiency in industry and commerce, households, transport and 
government. In addition, the White Paper commits the government to ensuring that an integrated 
resource planning (IRP) approach for large investment decisions by energy suppliers and service 
providers is undertaken. 
Since the release of the White Paper, the DME has made some progress in reaching the goals 
presented in the document (see Appendix A). Interestingly, though, progress has been made in 
areas that were initiated prior to the (i) release of the White Paper (i.e. prior to December 1998) and 
{ii) to the restructuring of the Energy Branch, in 1998, when a position dedicated towards energy 
efficiency issues were scrapped. Few, if any, new activities related specifically to energy-efficiency 
investments have been initiated since this time.4 This is probably because there is currently no office 
in the DME dedicated towards promoting energy efficiency in South Africa (see for example Clark 
and Barberton (1999) as well as Section 5.2.1 below). 
Our contention is that government must now decide, once and for all, whether it will seek to protect 
and promote energy-efficiency investment. If it stands by its White Paper position - i.e. that energy 
See Clark & Barberton (1999) for a detailed explanation of other governmental barriers inhibiting investment in 
energy-efficiency programmes. 
The budget for the Energy Branch for the year 2000 is R29 million. Of this, R2.5 million is dedicated towards 
energy efficiency issues. 
In 1999, the DME awarded the Minerals and Energy Policy Centre (MEPC) a project to assist the DME in 
building its in-house capacity in Integrated Energy Planning, or Integrated Resource Planning. While both call for 
an assessment of both demand- and supply-side investment options, these planning approaches do not 
necessarily involve the actual implementation of public benefit energy-efficiency programmes: various demand-
side options are made available during the assessment, yet it is likely that implementors (especially utilities) will 
seek to invest primarily in options that make clear commercial sense. Interestingly, public benefit energy-
efficiency options generally yield significant societal benefits, but may not be in the best interests of individual 
implementors. 
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efficiency is a priority for government - then, it should accept the consequences of doing so. This 
means that it shouid provide a reasonable budget, human resources and support for activities that 
will allow for energy-efficiency investment, in particular public benefit energy-efficiency investment. 
It should be noted that in doing so government does not need to (nor should, in our opinion) 
become an implementor of energy-efficiency programmes/activities. Rather, it should seek to create 
an enabling environment for energy efficiency, in so doing, encouraging private sector involvement 
and investment in this area. 
We recommend that if government is to be seen to be a credible leader in the 
area of energy efficiency, then it must fulfil its commitments as detailed in the 
White Paper on Energy Policy for South Africa (1998). 
5.2 Governance arrangements to promote energy efficiency 
5.2.1 The DME's organisational structure must support energy efficiency 
In the past few years, senior management of the DME have struggled to identify an organisational 
structure that supports energy efficiency. Prior to 1997, Energy efficiency staff/programmes were 
housed in the electrical energy division of the Energy Branch together with electricity, gas and coal. 
This is illustrated in Table 1 below. 
Directorate 





Energy for developing areas 
Information dissemination 
Biomass 
Electricity and gas 
Energy efficiency 
Coal 
Table 1: Focal research areas of the Chief Directorate: Energy Branch 
Source: James & Simmonds (1996) 
Table 1 demonstrates the fragmented nature of policy formulation and research administration with 
the DME. If it is assumed there that the primary beneficiaries of public benefit energy-efficiency 
programmes are households, then the separation of household energy issues is concerning. These 
issues fall under the Energy for Developing Areas sub-directorate, while energy supply issues fall 
under the Electrical Energy directorate. Furthermore, the Energy Efficiency sub-directorate falls 
under the Electrical Energy directorate, thus limiting policies and strategies to improving electrical 
energy-efficiency. Within this structure, it was difficult for the Department to develop a national 
strategy on public benefit energy-efficiency (Simmonds & Clark 1997). Due in part to these and 
other organisational concerns, the Energy Branch of the DME was re-organised, in 1998. Table 2 




Nuclear and Renewables 
Directoratel(sub!directorates) 
Electrification (grid and non-grid) 
EDI restructuring and policy 
Liquid fuels 
Coal and gas and the environment 
Nuclear 
Renewables 
Table 2: Focal areas of the Energy Branch 
Source: Surridge (1999) 
Chief Directors are respon~ible for the cross-cutting issues of black economic empowerment; capacity building; 
health, safety and the environment and energy efficiency. 
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This structure, which is also the current structure, assumes energy efficiency, together with black 
empowerment, capacity building, and education to be 'cross-cutting' energy issues. There is no 
longer a line function (or an office) for energy-efficiency issues, as there used to be in the previous 
organisational structure illustrated in Table 1 above. At the time of the inception of this 
organisational structure, senior staff of the Energy Branch were adamant that this organisational 
structure should not be taken to indicate that energy efficiency was no longer a priority· of 
government. To the contrary, energy-efficiency programmes - particularly those targeted at the 
domestic sector- were said to remain key. While energy efficiency does, indeed, concern all aspects-
of energy, it was argued that, since a dedicated line function (and associated personnel and other 
resources) for energy efficiency no longer existed, it was in grave danger of petering out. It could 
now be argued that, given this organisational structure, the DME has done well in the past two years 
to ensure that projects implemented prior to the launch of the White Paper on Energy Policy have 
remained on track. 
A proposal to further re-organise the Energy Branch is currently being considered by senior 
management of the DME. It has been mentioned that this organisational structure- if accepted- will 
include a Deputy Director position dedicated towards promoting energy-efficiency investment and 
environmental issues. It is proposed that this position be housed in a new Energy Planning 
Directorate. 
We recommend that the proposal to re-introduce a position dedicated towards 
energy efficiency and environmental issues is adopted and implemented as soon 
as possible. Like environmental issues, capacity building and black economic 
empowerment, energy efficiency should be treated as a cross-cutting issue and 
should not be associated with just electricity but rather with energy in general.6 
We recommend that the function of this job include but not be limited to the following: 
• to initiate, co-ordinate and drive governmental activities related to energy and thermal 
efficiency; 
• to monitor and evaluate these initiatives; 
• to develop and enforce the DME's policy positions in this area; 
• to build and strengthen linkages between the DME and its energy regulators, including 
the NER; 
Thus, 
to support the establishment and work of the proposed National Energy Efficiency 
Agency. 
Our recommendation is that the function of this position is to facilitate the 
creation of an enabling environment for public benefit energy-efficiency in South 
Africa, and not to become involved in in-depth implementation activities linked 
with the energy services industry. 
5.2.2 A National Energy Efficiency Agency should be established 
As has been noted, the DME has capacity and other resource constraints and, within them, must 
address a number of priority issues. So the DME's main current responsibility should be creating an 
enabling environment for energy-efficiency investment in South Africa. 7 Yet South Africa's energy 
services industry is in its infancy8 and undoubtedly will require some nurturing by the public sector 
before it can attract (on a sustainable basis) private sector investments that will grow the market for 
energy services. 
In many ways, this new proposed organisational structure represents a combination. of the DME's previous two 
organisational structures. It combines the position that there should be an office for energy efficiency, and also 
acknowledges that energy efficiency is a cross-cutting issue. 
The government cannot afford to do otherwise: it should be promoting energy efficiency, yet it should not be 
taking a lead role in the implementation of energy efficiency projects. 
See Appendix B for an explanation of the natural evolution of the energy service industry. 
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Other countries - including Ghana, Brazil and Thailand - have faced similar dilemmas. With young 
energy service industries requiring public sector support, coupled with over-burdened, under-
resourced government departments (with limited capacity to undertake programmes/activities 
required to boost this industry, which.would then enable government to play a less interventionist 
role commensurate with the limited resources), some governments have chosen to establish public-
sector agencies mandated to promote energy-efficiency investment nationally. Depending on the 
context and circumstance and agency mandate, these public sector agencies have been mandated 
to fill the aforementioned gap, as well as conduct other activities (related especially to regulatory 
requirements). For the most, these agencies have sought to strengthen private sector participation 
and investment in this area,9 while also focusing on ensuring that adequate public benefit energy-
efficiency investments are made. Thus, these agencies have sought to promote sustainable 
development in the energy sector through customer education activities (including information 
campaigns, training, audits and demonstrations), policy advocacy,10 market transformation 
initiatives, design and implementation of energy-efficiency investments, and energy research and 
development. 11 
The NER has stated its intention to require by default that distributors (as well as 
potentiaVexisting generators and transmitters) adopt IRP principles when assessing new 
investment decisions. Indeed, the Regulator is requiring that an IRP be submitted to the NER 
for licence granting purposes. In addition, the Regulator is currently considering whether to 
make it a systematic requirement that distributors undertake a specific minimal level of 
investment in public benefit energy-efficiency investment. From the perspectives of the IRP 
requirement, and even more so, the likely energy-efficiency investment requirement, the 
establishment of a National Energy Efficiency Agency would also be important. This agency 
could support these initiatives primarily through: 
assisting the NER in the development of standards of performance; 
assisting distributors in the identification of projects/programmes that comply with the 
requirements of the NER; 
• ensuring that the project/programmes comply with these requirements; 
undertaking market transformation activities; and 
• educating residential, commercial and industrial end-use customers. 
Clearly, if the NER requires that a minimal amount of investment in public benefit energy-efficiency 
investment be made, it will have no option but to develop or buy-in skills and capacity in these 
areas, and in particular with the first three items listed. Without this support, international experience 
indicates that distributor utilities are very likely to abuse the system and will most probably 
undertake energy efficiency activities that are in their own best interests, while avoiding investments 
in public benefit energy-efficiency investments even though they yield wider societal benefits. Thus, 
if a National Energy Efficiency Agency were established, it could support the activities of both 
government and the NER in meaningful ways. This inherently means that the interests of customers 
would then be supported. 
If a National Energy Efficiency Agency were established in South Africa, it would be important for 
government and the NER to ensure that it receive a mandate to act independently of all prevailing 
interests. Experience from other countries indicates that if links between the Agency and these other 
institutions are too tightly knit, then this type of agency would be in danger of being swayed by 
prevailing biases. This could be particularly threatening with regard to budgetary allocations or 




Ironically, these public agencies have in some cases 'crowded- out' private sector involvement in this area! 
For the most, these agencies have been tasked with recommending energy-efficiency related policy to 
government though they have not been responsible for policy decisions. 
See Clark ( 1999) for a detailed discussion of public sector energy-efficiency agency models employed in England 
and Wales, Norway, New Zealand, Thailand, Ghana and Brazil. 
In Thailand and Brazil, public sector agencies were established to promote, primarily but not limited to, public 
benefit energy-efficiency investments. The budgets of these agencies were (and still are) linked with those of the 
main utilities in the countries. A number of times since both of their establishments, annual budgets have almost 
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budget for a National Energy Efficiency Agency is secured for at least the first five years of its 
existence. Due to budgetary constraints within government, it is unlikely that the Agency could or 
should receive or expect funding from government. Initial discussions with international 
development aid organisations suggest that there are opportunities for alternative funding 
arrangements. As has been detailed below, we also make recommendation for the adoption of a 
public benefits surcharge. Proceeds from this surcharge could pay for aspects of the Agencies 
activities (i.e. education, training and awareness initiatives, training and audits, demonstrations, 
verification). If this public benefits surcharge were adopted, international funding should probably be 
secured mainly for start-up and overhead expenditures of the Agency.13 
A year or so ago, the DME set in motion the process of determining the feasibility of a National 
Energy Efficiency Agency. A draft business plan has been delivered to consultants commissioned to 
investigate this issue. Due to DME priorities and resource constraints, and also a wariness of 
establishing another public agency (given DME's record with this) this initiative has not been carried 
forward. It has been suggested though, that a second, more in-depth, study of the feasibility of such 
an Agency be commissioned. 
It would be a great loss to South African society if a National Energy Efficiency Agency were not 
established primarily because of DME's possible hesitancy with 'independent public sector agencies. 
If, indeed, this model is of great concern to the DME, then it would be worthwhile (a) assessing the 
reasons for the mistakes made with regard the NER and REFSA and then seeking ways of taking 
account of these concerns in the formulation of more acceptable structures and processes, or (b) 
seeking out alternative organisational structures for an entity that undertakes the work of the nature 
described above. 14 
We recommend that government initiate a second (this time, more in-depth) 
feasibility study of a National Energy Efficiency Agency. This feasibility study 
should take into account the likely impacts that power sector restructuring will 
have on investment in public benefit energy-efficiency programmes. 
5.3 Other activities to support energy efficiency 
5.3.1 Government must continue to develop and implement standards and codes 
The White Paper on Energy Policy commits government to establishing codes/norms and standards 
for industrial equipment, the transport sector, commercial buildings and residential dwellings. 
Besides entrusting government with various educational and awareness initiatives (such as the 
development of educational materials), the White Paper also commits government to promoting the 





Government has completed the South African Energy and Demand Efficiency Standard 
(SAEDES). The SAEDES are now with a technical team within the South African Bureau of 
Standards (SABS). It is hoped that the SAEDES will become mandatory standards in time. 
The Environmentally Sound Low-Cost Housing Task Team has completed a discussion 
document on guidelines/recommendations for energy efficiency, water efficiency and urban 
been eradicated because utility sale/revenues had declined in the previous year or because the electricity 
industry has been in financial disarray. 
See Section 6.3.2 below for a more detailed discussion of this. 
In May 2000, Energy Efficiency Enterprises held a workshop to launch the Energy Training Foundation's Core 
Training Programme (CTP). At this workshop the ETF proposed its solutions regarding energy training in South 
Africa, and asked stakeholders for input and comment. The event was sponsored by commerce and industry. 
The Energy Training Foundation was established with a view to undertaking some of the activities that were 
proposed of a National Energy Efficiency Agency that was proposed but not established. It has been suggested 
that the Energy Training Foundation will continue to seek out funds from commercial and industrial outfits for 
commercial and industrial training purposes, but that these funds will also be used to cross-subsidise public 
benefit energy service initiatives (i.e. those which do not easily attract investment, but which unambiguously 
yield benefit to society). Even though this type of initiative is truly welcomed, it is clear that its impact would be 
smaller than if these activities were supported/initiated by a national agency. Perhaps - as government struggles 
to address all of its priority issues, as well as being faced by huge resource constraints - this is currently the way 
togo. 
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greening. This task team has also inputted into a Minimum Norms and Standards document on 
low-cost housing. 
• The DME has transferred its programme on domestic appliance labelling to the Department of 
Trade and Industry. Little progress has been made in this regard. Eskom is considering taking 
this programme on again (as a research activity). 
• A SADC Petroleum Sub-Committee has been established to investigate fuel standards and 
specifications for the entire SADC region. 
• No progress has been made on establishing energy efficiency standards for industrial 
equipment. 
The development of legislation detailing codes and standards for energy efficiency should be one of 
government's key activities. This legislation supports and complements other activities of 
government, and also of the NER. Indeed, as more competition is introduced into the power sector 
(and therefore as regulatory tools and approaches change), codes and standards will become 
increasingly important. 
We recommend that the government continue and grow its work on standards 
and codes for energy efficiency. The DME should initiate/co-ordinate these 
activities. 
Areas of work which the Department could concentrate on include: 
ensuring that SAEDES do become mandatory standards; 
• lobbying for greater emphasis to be placed on thermal and energy efficiency standards in 
overall low-cost housing standards; 
ensuring that the appliance-labelling programme has a home, and that developments in 
the area are made; 
developing standards and codes for industrial equipment; and 
• developing monitoring, evaluation and enforcement functions for all mandatory 
standards and codes. 
5.3.2 Government and the NER must work together in the area of energy efficiency 
As noted, the energy services industry in which energy services companies (ESCOs) operate is 
limited. Currently, most energy-efficiency-related programmes and projects are being initiated by 
Eskom and, to a smaller extent, municipal distributors. As restructuring in South Africa progresses, it 
is likely that government and the NER will be less likely to rely on these institutions to conduct these 
programmes and thereby keep the energy services industry alive. 15 
It will become more important that government and the NER work together to 
create an environment that encourages investment in energy efficiency. 
This report suggests that government and the NER consider various policy options and activities. 
These have been recommended on the basis that they complement and support each other and that 
together they comprise an integrated strategy that the public sector could employ to support and 
promote energy-efficiency investment in South Africa. Obviously, if various of the options are not 
taken up by government and the NER, then the strategy would be considerably weakened, because, 
in effect, one of the linkages that holds it together would severed. Figure 3 below illustrates this 
integrated approach. Two obvious examples of this are as follows. Firstly, if the NER puts in place a 
minimal energy-efficiency investment requirement, then it will be very important that legislation 
detailing codes and standards for these investments (in households, commerce, industry and 
institutional buildings) are put in place. Developing codes and standards is the overall responsibility 
of government. Secondly, it is probable that staff of both the government and the NER will need to 
lobby for the establishment of the National Energy Efficiency Agency. Without full support of both 
these institutions, it is unlikely that progress will be made in this area. 
15 International experience shows these investments tends to fall away on the introduction, or just the threat of the 
introduction of more competition into the wholesale and retail components of the business. Vertically integrated 
utilities like Eskom are no longer able to justify these programmes because generation, transmission and 
distribution industries are de-linked (Clark 1999; Barberton 1999). 
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We recommend that the DME senior management adopt the proposal to 
establish a full-time post dedicated towards energy efficiency on the condition 
that one of the main objectives of this post is to ensure that the DME work 
closely with the NER on energy-efficiency related issues. 
6. Recommendations to the NER 
6.1 The NER's position on energy efficiency 
In seeking to protect consumer's interests, the NER holds a difficult position. On the one hand, it 
carries a responsibility for ensuring that the price of electricity remains low; on the other, it must 
ensure that opportunities for energy-efficiency investment are promoted. Regulators in other 
countries have attempted to deal with this apparent dilemma in two different ways. Firstly, regulators 
have chosen to adopt a light-handed approach to energy efficiency, and have relied on market 
forces to initiate investment in this area. Secondly, while maintaining responsibility for key 
regulatory functions, they have chosen to assign many of their day-to-day energy-efficiency 
responsibilities to an independent organisation that is either retained or established for that purpose. 
We recommend that the NER adopt the latter approach {see recommendation below). 
In a similar way in which we suggested that the government creates an enabling environment for 
energy efficiency, we recommend here that the NER facilitate the creation of a culture within the 
electricity industry according to which energy efficiency is seen to be an investment that creates 
considerable social benefits and is therefore a service worth purchasing. Because of the significant 
market barriers inhibiting investment in this area, we believe that unless this culture is created little 
investment in energy efficiency will eventuate. In the remainder of this section, we recommend both 
supportive and regulatory roles for the NER which, if undertaken in parallel, could assist it in going 
some way towards creating this culture. 
The recommendations proposed to the NER in this report are based on the commonly held opinion 
that, as the power sector reforms, regulatory tools will become the most powerful means of ensuring 
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that public benefit energy-efficiency investment is made. 16 Indeed, the position that the NER takes in 
this area will be the key determinant of the 'shape' of energy-efficiency investment in South Africa 
for many years to come. It could be argued that the recommendations made in this section are too 
ambitious and difficult to adopt/implement given prevailing circumstances. The counter-argument to 
this is that if appropriate regulations are not put in place to ensure adequate investment in this area 
then it is very unlikely that this investment will occur. 
We recommend that the NER make a decision on whether it will seek to support 
investment in public benefit energy-efficiency. Broadly, this would entail the 
creation of a regulatory framework in which supply- and demand-side 
investments are both valued, and therefore considered. 
We recommend that the NER play a lead role in developing a culture of 
investment in public benefit energy efficiency. This should be done through 
close involvement in policy development and advocacy in this area, but through 
leaving the various supportive, enforcement, monitoring and evaluatory 
functions, as well as implementation of a public-interest programmes, to the 
National Energy Efficiency Agency. 
In the remainder of Section 6, we adopt a three-pronged approach. First, we will make the 
suggestion that the NER ensures that the regulatory framework that it adopts in the future does not 
disincentivise energy-efficiency programmes. In other words, our recommendations seek to remove 
disincentives for energy-efficiency investment. Second, we make suggestions on how the NER can 
ensure that a minimum amount of investment in energy efficiency is made. Thirdly, we suggest to 
the NER ways of incentivising energy-efficiency investments. 
6.2 Regulatory measures to support energy efficiency 
6.2.1 The NER should seek to remove disincentives to invest in energy efficiency 
Currently, the NER bases its tariff-making decisions on a combination of benchmarking exercises, 
rate-of-return regulation and performance-based regulation. In other words, the regulatory 
framework adopted by the NER follows neither rate-of-return regulation nor a price-cap approach in 
their purest senses. It seems likely - in new electricity contexts - that the decisions of NER will be 
more clearly linked to a performance-based regulatory regime (though until retail competition is 
introduced into the distribution industry it is likely that some benchmarking will continue to occur). 
In developing a new approach to regulating the electricity industry, we recommend that the NER 
move away from including mechanisms in the regulatory framework which disincentivise utilities 
from investing in energy-efficiency programmes. Regulatory tariff structures, for instance, often link 
energy sales (kWh) with utility revenues and profits. This is a clear disincentive for the utility to 
engage in any DSM that can reduce sales. As a means of overcoming this disincentive, regulatory 
authorities have designed tariff structures (and revenue allowances) such that the income to the 
utility is not dependent on sales volume (in kWh) but on some other measure of service (such as 
growth in number of customers, or estimated sales based on an attrition mechanism). 17 In other 
words, instead of letting revenues grow with increasing kWh sales, regulators allow revenues to grow 
with other factors that are independent of changes in actual electricity use. Regulators use 
decoupling mechanisms to achieve this result. These mechanisms partially or fully remove both the 
incentive to increase electricity sales and the disincentive to run energy-efficiency programmes. 
Simply put, regulatory authorities periodically set tariffs for utilities. During each of the years 
between when tariffs are set, utilities collect any extra revenues associated with sales higher than 
those forecasted (or deficient revenues associated with sales below the forecast) in a balancing 
16 
17 
Experience from other countries indicates that it is particularly important for Regulators to specify what type of 
energy-efficiency investment is required (see Section 6.2.2). Here, as noted, the focus will be on public benefit 
energy-efficiency investment. 
This mechanism adjusts the components of fixed costs on the basis of various endogenous factors (that are not 
controlled by the utility) such as inflation rates and other costs and productivity indices. The attrition mechanism 
includes financial (e.g. cost of capital), operational (e.g. wage rates and costs of certain materials) and rate-base 
(e.g. additions/subtractions from the utility's rate base) adjustments. 
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account. During the following year, these excess (or deficit) revenues are refunded to (or collected 
from) customers by decreasing (or increasing) the price of electricity. 18·19 
We recommend that through decoupling and other mechanisms, the NER, seek 
to ensure that utilities' profits are not linked to revenues and sales. 
We are of the belief that this decoupling process will represent an important means of assisting the 
NER in the development of a culture of interest in energy-efficiency investment. 20 Indeed, 
decoupling has been shown to be an important prerequisite for transforming utilities from sellers of 
an energy commodity to providers of energy services. 
6.2.2 The NER should require a minimal amount of public benefit energy-efficiency 
investment 
If government is able to re-affirm that energy efficiency is a key priority for it, then it follows that the 
NER must require that distributors (either current municipal distributors or forthcoming REDs) 
undertake a certain amount of investment in public benefit energy-efficiency investment. As noted 
above, international experience indicates that if this requirement is not specified then it is highly 
unlikely that this investment will voluntarily occur.21 
On requiring that this 'minimum' amount of investment in energy efficiency, regulators around the 
world have generally also established 'standards of performance' or guidelines which are then issued 
to distributors to assist them in making the appropriate amount and nature of investment. Regarding 
the appropriate amount of investment, regulators generally call for a percentage of annual revenues 
or distributed energy to be spent on energy-efficiency programmes/projects.22 Regarding the nature 
of investment, standards of performance have generally linked distributor activities to codes and 
standards set out in legislation, as well as to formal linkages established between distributors 
initiating the investment, and an independent energy agency (see Section 5.2.2). 
Experience from different countries stresses the importance of providing careful details on the 
precise nature of the energy-efficiency investment requirement stipulated by the standards of 
performance. Insightful experience comes from Brazil in this respect. The Brazilian Regulatory 
Authority, ANEEL, has specified in all of the Terms of Sale of public utilities to private sector 
partners that the latter must spend 1% of annual revenues (sales less taxes) on energy-efficiency 






Total regulated investments (A) 
~ 1. 00 % of total annual revenues 
End-use efficiency (B) Research &development (C) 
~ 0.1 % Annual Revenues 
Supply-side efficiency (D) 
(A) -[(B)+( C)] ~ 0.25% Annual Revenues 





Alternative Energy Sources 





~ 0.025% public sector 
~ 0.025% industrial sector 
~ 0.025% residential sector 
• 
• 
Quality of Services 
Co-generation 
Table 3: ANEEL Resolution 261 
These particular revenue adjustments only deal with fixed costs. 
• Reduction of commercial losses 
• Reduction of technical losses 
For a more detailed description of decoupling mechanisms, as well as a discussion of the differences between 
decoupling and net lost revenue adjustment mechanisms see Appendix C. 
More correctly, this section on 'decoupling sales from profits' should appear in the section on financing 
mechanisms below. As a means of explaining how the NER should broadly position· itself, however, it has been 
place in this section on regulatory tools. 
The possible alternative, or better still, complement to this, is the introduction of the public benefits surcharge. 
See Section 6.3.2 for more details on this. 
In England and Wales, the merged Office of Electricity Regulation and Office of Gas Supply require that 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) achieve certain energy saving levels. By virtue of Standards of 
perfomance /: (1994-1998), RECs were required to achieve 0.675% of distributed energy. In Brazil, privatised 
distributors are required by ANEEL Resolution 261 to spend at least 1% of total annual revenues. 
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An assessment of regulated investments for a number of Brazilian utilities indicates that legal 
requirements for end-use, and research and development investments are generally just met. Most of 
their investments, however, are being channelled into programmes that aim to reduce commercial 
losses and to increase profit margin (in other words, those specified by column Din Table 3 above). 
It is suggested that it is only natural for utilities to adopt the approach chosen by utilities in Brazil and 
elsewhere- i.e. to be economically efficient and competitive. Thus, it may be seen to be excessive 
for regulation concerning mandatory supply-side efficiency investments to be developed. Rather, it 
may only be important to mandate investments in public benefit energy-efficiency 
programmes/projects. In following this approach, the NER will need to identify the energy-efficiency 
(and other) areas that utilities are not likely to invest in. It might also be appropriate for the NER to 
determine which public benefits are priority ones. Thus, 
We recommend that the NER develop Standards of Performance which detail 
the nature and value of the minimum public benefit energy-efficiency 
investments which municipal distributors or REDs would be obligated to 
initiate. 
We further recommend that the NER assess different stipulations of this 
requirement (for instance through total annual revenues, through distributed 
energy, through customer base etc). 
The case of Brazil is also interesting from the point of view of the enforcement of these regulated 
investments. As is the case in South Africa, in Brazil the regulatory tradition is not strong, and 
regulatory authorities are still being organised and trained. Brazil. is also a country in which a 
competitive energy market must be created, powerful lobbies must be controlled and public interests 
must be protected. Unfortunately, public interest issues are therefore frequently not on the priority 
lists of energy sector stakeholders and decision-makers. Regulatory authorities are under-resourced, 
and still have to develop an ability to enforce and evaluate the progress of investments in utility 
managed programmes. South Africa, like Brazil, is still in the early stages of this learning curve. 
We recommend that the NER either develop in-house capacity to ensure that the 
minimum energy-efficiency requirements meet criteria as detailed in the 
Standards of Performance or that it retain the services of the (proposed) 
National Energy Efficiency Agency to do so. 
A combination of these two options would probably be optimal. In this regard, the NER would seek 
to develop limited in-house capacity to administer, analyse or take strategic decisions in this area, 
but rely principally on the services of a National Energy Efficiency Agency to support municipal 
distributors or REDs in this process.23 
It should be noted that this recommendation to establish minimum energy-efficiency requirements is 
done in full cognisance of the stipulations of the NER that all large investment decisions should be 
based on principles of IRP, and that local, national and regulator IRPs should be undertaken (and 
periodically submitted to the NER by distribution, transmission and generation businesses. Even 
though we are aware that IRPs require assessment and integration of both supply- and demand-side 
options, we have made this additional recommendation to ensure that (a) a specific type of 
demand-side investment is undertaken - i.e. public benefit energy-efficiency (indeed, it is unlikely 
that an IRP would include public benefit energy-efficiency programmes); and (b) that programmes, 
projects and policies are in fact implemented and not just planned.24 
A culture based on the widespread belief that energy efficiency is worthwhile will not be created if 
utilities are unsupported in their attempts to initiate investments in this area. This support should 
come from the public sector in various different ways. Government should create an enabling 
environment for energy-efficiency investment (as explained in Section 5). The NER's most powerful 
way of contributing to the development of this culture is through utilising of various regulatory 
mechanisms which enable utilities to recover the costs of public benefit energy-efficiency 
programmes, recover lost revenues associated with these programmes, or even profit from DSM 
programmes. Recommendations on the way forward in this area are presented in Section 6.3 below. 
23 
24 
See Section 5.2.2 for details of proposed activities for the National Energy Efficiency Agency. 
International experience indicates that for licence requirements, utilities often show demand-side options in IRPs 
but then do not implement them. 
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6.3 Financing mechanisms to support energy efficiency 
In this section, recommendations are made to the NER (and government), on how to create 
incentives to invest in energy-efficiency programmes. We address ways of financing mandatory 
energy-efficiency programmes (as recommended in Section 6.2 above), and pay for lost revenues 
and programme costs incurred by utilities when undertaking these energy-efficiency programmes. 
6.3.1 The NER could establish mechanisms for utilities to recover programme costs 
and lost revenues 
When utilities undertake energy-efficiency programmes, they incur various costs including: (i) those 
directly associated with the programme (equipment purchases, subsidies etc), (ii) running costs 
(salaries, administration overheads etc), and (iii) lost revenues occurring as a result of these 
programmes. In this section, we make recommendations on how the NER may enable utilities to 
recover the costs described in (ii) and (iii) above, while section 6.3.2 begins to address ways of 
paying for the costs described in (i) above. The discussion below focuses on mechanisms to recover 
lost revenues. Generally, mechanisms to recover programme costs are similar in that programme 
costs are recouped through tariff adjustments but are usually simpler in that it is often unnecessary to 
establish a balancing account in an assessment of costs. 
International and local experiences indicate that lost revenues are generally the largest negative 
financial consequence of a successful energy-efficiency programme in the short run and hence it is 
important for regulatory authorities and utilities to come to agreement on how these lost revenues 
will be treated. It is likely in South Africa that utilities, with or without specific directives or 
obligations to make investments in energy-efficiency programmes, will approach the NER for 
assistance/support in this specific area. This section focuses on possible mechanisms to address these 
lost revenues. 
Some regulators have employed net lost revenue adjustment mechanisms (NLRA) to make provision 
for lost revenues. Extensive experience of NLRA mechanisms comes from the United States. Other 
countries which have prioritised energy-efficiency investments have tended to rely on providing 
financing for direct programme costs but not for lost revenues. Indeed, regulatory authorities in these 
countries have: 
introduced special revenue allowances {payable by customers) that utilities can draw 
from to finance direct costs of energy-efficiency programmes {see Section 6.3.2 below); 
and/or 
maintained the position that the spin-off effects associated with these programmes (i.e. 
customer retention, opportunity to undertake marketing/promotional activity etc.) more 
than make up for these revenue losses. 
NLRAs are generally the most prevalent way utilities have been compensated for changes in 
revenues associated with utility DSM programmes. While there are a number of generic types of 
NLRA mechanisms, 25 the mechanism agreed upon in most cases is related to context, and is usually 
unique to others. To implement an NLRA, the utility first estimates energy and load reductions 
caused by its DSM programmes for the year in question. These GWh and MWh savings are then 
multiplied by the difference between the retail price and short-term costs (both energy and capacity) 
and the two products (lost energy and lost capacity revenues) are added together. This sum is the 
net lost revenue caused by the utility's DSM programme. It is called 'net' because it is equal to the 
difference between the reduction in utility revenue minus the reduction in utility costs (fuel and 
variable 0 & M costs). In a similar fashion to decoupling (see Section 6.2.1 above), a balancing 
account is then utilised to enable utilities to recover lost revenues through tariff adjustments. The 
basis for a NLRA surcharge on a customer's bill can differ. A single surcharge may be applied to all 
customers, or the surcharge may differ by customer class, depending upon how the regulator 
decides to allocate revenue recovery costs. If the NER were to develop a NLRA mechanism in South 
Africa, it is recommended that equity and poverty issues be taken account of. 
25 There are three broad categories of NLRA mechanisms. These include the (i) prospective surcharge mechanism 
which recovers lost revenue as a result of current DSM programme-year activities; (ii) the retrospective surcharge 
which is designed to recover revenue lost from DSM activity in a previous year or years; and (iii) the deferred 
account mechanism which uses a tracking mechanism that records monthly net lost revenue estimates. The 
utility then receives authorisation to recover this estimated net lost revenue at its next tariff review. 
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NLRA mechanisms are problematic for utilities and regulators in today's environment because net 
lost revenue from DSM programmes tends to accumulate over time, so that the sustained use of 
NLRA mechanisms may lead to higher tariffs. In essence, NLRAs effectively address short-term 
problems of revenue losses between the times in which tariffs are set, yet do not address a long-term 
problem which is that energy efficiency erodes the revenue base of the utility. Ultimately, this 
erosion will result in fixed costs being spread across a smaller revenue base than the utility would 
experience without DSM. 
A partial solution to this is for utilities to develop programmes that reduce or eliminate adverse tariff 
impacts. Utilities can lower programme costs by reducing customer incentives, for example, or by 
moving incentive programmes to information and financing assistance. Tariff design changes can 
also reduce the impact of DSM programmes on tariffs and fixed-cost recovery. Increasing the 
percentage of fixed costs to the monthly demand charge, for example, will reduce both the price 
impact and net lost-revenue impact of DSM. NRLAs can also evolve in response to changing 
industry conditions. Regulators may cap the total net lost revenues that a utility can recover over a 
specified period. Alternatively, regulators can allow recovery of a portion of lost revenues from DSM. 
Another option is setting a time limit on net lost-revenue recovery (up to three years?). Utilities 
concerned about tariff impacts may choose to forgo net lost revenue recovery altogether and instead 
recover only programme costs or performance incentives. 
We recommend that the NER undertake a critical assessment of NLRAs. This 
assessment should include investigations of the economic, administrative and 
institutional implications of establishing such a mechanism. The decision 
whether the NER should establish NLRAs should be linked closely with the 
decision whether the NER supports the establishment of the public benefits 
surcharge (see Section 6.3.2). Even though the NLRA and the public benefits 
surcharge would finance different aspects of utilities' energy-efficiency 
investment, it is recommended that the NER does not do both. 
International experience indicates that, as more competition is introduced into the electricity 
wholesale and distribution, NLRA mechanisms become less useful. The fundamental reason for this 
is that competition brings with it downwards pressure on prices. Even though NLRA mechanisms are 
available to utilities, they are loath to take them up (and therefore invest in energy-efficiency 
programmes) because NLRAs generally result in tariff increases which could mean lost utility 
business. For this reason, countries, including some of the United States, have introduced a public 
benefits surcharge (see Section 6.3.2 below). 
6.3.2 Utilities should not profit from their public benefit energy-efficiency investments 
In attempting to provide incentives to utilities to invest in energy-efficiency programmes, some 
regulators (and mainly in the United States) have allowed utilities to earn a 'reasonable rate of 
return' on DSM investments. This policy represents an attempt by regulators to provide a level 
playing field for supply- and demand- related investments. In this regard, regulators have allowed 
utilities to profit from DSM programmes in the following ways: 
• Shared-savings mechanisms. The shared-savings incentive mechanism provides utilities (or their 
shareholders) with a share of the energy savings benefits, or 'net benefits'. Shared savings are the 
most common mechanism used to reward utilities for investing in DSM programmes. 
• Bonus mechanisms. Bonus mechanisms reward utility shareholders on a per-unit basis for energy 
and demand savings. Bonus mechanisms are less common than shared savings. 
• Mark-up mechanisms. Mark-up mechanisms provide a mark-up on DSM progamme 
expenditures, generally varying from five to ten per cent. Mark-up mechanisms frequently apply 
to a subset of utility programmes, where energy savings benefits are particularly difficult to 
measure (i.e. information programmes) or where the programmes undertaken are based on 
equity rather than efficiency considerations. 
We recommend that the NER does not allow utilities to profit from energy-
efficiency investments either through mark-up or bonus mechanisms. The NER 
does not have the capacity to administer these mechanisms. Additionally, these 
mechanisms can invite regulatory abuse and programmes that look good on 
paper but do not achieve the desired results. 
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6.3.3 A non-bypassable systems-wide public benefit surcharge could be created 
To sustain productive public benefit energy-efficiency investment during the transition period of the 
electric utility restructuring, a very promising solution lies in the adoption of a non-bypassable 
systems benefit charge on electricity distribution services. Traditionally, the public benefits charge 
has been regulatory authorities' solution to providing public benefits where retail competition has 
been introduced. This 'new' cost recovery approach does not necessarily require a change in current 
tariffs, tariff structures or cost allocations amongst customer classes. Regulators around the world 
have merely been making it explicit that those who use integrated power systems cannot bypass 
their share of contributions to system benefits by designating a new supplier of kilowatt-hours over 
the integrated grid. 
Such charges are generally based on usage (kWh), demand (kW) or lump sum by virtue of being a 
customer, and are generally utilised to pay for various public benefits including energy efficiency, 
programmes for low-income households, energy R&D, and renewables. The surcharges employed 
internationally have generally been small, to the extent that they are hardly recognisable on the 
bill.26 Generally, regulatory authorities have obliged distributors to collect this special revenue 
allowance. Depending on the regulatory directive, distributors have either then spent these funds in 
appropriate fashion, or have been directed to forward the funds they have collected to the 
regulatory authority which has then re-distributed these funds where appropriate. 27 
Our recommendation is that the NER undertake a detailed analysis of a 
potential public benefits surcharge. The analysis should investigate (i) how this 
public benefits charge should be collected and spent; (ii) what the charge per 
customer should be in order that adequate funds can be raised; (iii) what this 
charge should be spent on (energy efficiency, research and development, 
renewable energy, etc); (iv) what the role of the NER in this would be; (v) who 
_should pay this charge. The analysis and decision should be taken in close 
conjunction with the decisions as to whether a National Energy Efficiency 
Agency be established, and whether NLRA mechanisms should be established. 
Our initial impression is that the public benefits surcharge is the way forward for the NER. and not 
just for the sakes of energy-efficiency investment but for a number of public benefit programmes as 
mentioned above. Over the next few years, more competition will be introduced in various ways 
into the power sector in South Africa and this pubic benefits surcharge is a way of ensuring that 
public benefits can realistically be provided for in these contexts. If implemented. the surcharge 
should be designed so as to take account of South Africa's skewed income distribution (perhaps the 
poorest households in South Africa should not be subject to it). Distributors (in the future. REDs) 
should probably collect the surcharge, and either spend the funds appropriately. or forward these 
funds, in part on in whole, to the NER for redistribution. It would make sense that a proportion of 
these funds be allocated to the National Energy Efficiency Agency but that these funds are spent on 
the actual implementation of national programmes, and not on running/overhead costs. 
26 
27 
During the period 1994 to 1998, the Office of the Electricity Regulator required that Regional Electricity Councils 
(distributors) collect £1 per customer (i.e. 25p per year collected over 12 months). In Norway, distributors were 
obligated to collect 0.0003NOK/kWh. 
In England and Wales, the Regional Electricity Councils retain these funds and spend them accordingly. In 
Norway, the 'wires' charge is collected by distributors but transferred to Regional Energy Efficiency' Centres to be 
spent in unbiased fashion. In the United States, regulatory authorities initially allowed the distributors who had 
collected these funds to spend them appropriately. Later, when it was recognised that utilities should not 
necessarily administer public funds, utilities were obligated by state regulatory authorities to collect the funds and 
then forward them to the regulator. The Regulator would then distribute these funds - in some cases, these 
would go back to the distributor while in other cases these funds would go to an independent energy agency 
responsible for undertaking public benefit energy-efficiency investment. Lately, large industrial customers whose 
contribution to these funds has been substantial, motivate for some of these funds being returned to them in 
order that they are able to finance some of their so-called public benefit energy-efficiency investment (Clark 
1999). 
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6.4 Other activities to support energy efficiency 
6.4.1 The NER should begin to learn now how regulatory mechanisms could work 
There has been a great deal of experience internationally on ensuring that public benefit energy-
efficiency investment occurs. For the most part, success in this area has come about after many 
years of learning and experimentation. South Africa can draw from these rich experiences to a 
certain extent but should also acknowledge that we can only hope to get it right through 
implementation and learning. 
As more competition is introduced into the power sector, investments in public benefit energy-
efficiency programmes are generally considerably reduced. We have been expecting this reduction 
in investment in South Africa. Currently, there is still some interest in utility-induced energy-
efficiency programmes. Indeed, Eskom alone recently committed R50 million towards the Efficient 
Lighting Initiative, towards a R65 million public benefit energy-efficiency programme for the next 
three years. Current opportunities - such as this one - should be capitalised upon by the NER so 
that when the next round of licences are to be issued, it will be ready to launch into full-scale energy 
efficiency policy implementation. 
We recommend that the NER begin now to test regulatory mechanisms to 
promote public benefit energy-efficiency programmes. 
The NER need not feel concerned that what it does now will represent its policy stance in the future. 
Indeed, there seems to be a good understanding within the industry that these types of initiatives are 
new to South Africa and that a period of learning is necessary. Initiatives of the NER should be done 
on a trial (or project-by-project) basis until the Regulator has more of a sense of how this process is 
best approached. The bottom line, though, is that the Regulator should begin to test possible 
mechanisms while the opportunities are still available (i.e. before competition is introduced). 
6.4.2 The NER should support and employ the services of a National Energy Efficiency 
Agency. 
In Section 5.2.2, we recommended that a National Energy Efficiency Agency be established. As 
noted, this agency would seek to support (and take pressure off) government activities in this area, 
as well as those of the NER. 
The establishment of a National Energy Efficiency Agency would be particularly important if the 
NER were to: 
• require a minimum amount of energy-efficiency investment, because there must be a 
function, institution or capacity to support distributors in 
identifying/designing/implementing projects, as well as enforce standards of performance 
(see Section 6.2.2 above); 
• include a public benefits surcharge in the regulatory framework, because there will need 
to be capacity and guidance to administer, spend these funds, as well provide guidance 
on how to do so. Some argue that as more competition is introduced, utilities become 
less objective in their ability to administer public funds (see section 6.3.2 above). 
The National Energy Efficiency Agency could also support the NER in developing standards of 
performance, and strengthening communication with the DME. 
6.4.3 The NER should work closely with government in the area of energy efficiency 
See section 5.3.2. above. 
7. Recommendations to Eskom and municipal 
distributors 
In this section, recommendations are made to both Eskom and municipal distributors on how to 
ensure that public benefit energy-efficiency investment occurs now and as more varying degrees of 
competition are introduced into South Africa's power sector. In other words, this section suggests 
interim policy positions and activities for interim as well as end-state electricity industry contexts. 
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7.1 The distribution industry's position on energy efficiency 
Internationally, the role of utilities in the initiation and/or implementation of public benefit energy-
efficiency programmes is changing. It is argued, on the one hand, that energy-efficiency investment 
is best handled by utilities because utilities know their customers, their energy usage patterns, and 
have developed sophisticated payment collection mechanisms. On the other hand, it is argued that 
utility investments are shaped by their bottom lines and therefore utilities cannot be objective. What, 
for instance, is to prevent utilities applying public funds to general marketing or customer retention 
programmes? Others contend that, just as multiple decision-makers cannot operate a transmission 
system reliably, utilities are unequipped to orchestrate a diversified mix of resource for meeting the 
economy's electrical service needs at the lowest possible life-cycle costs. Thus, it is questioned 
whether utilities should remain responsible for managing public benefit programmes, and 
particularly for administering public funds designated for social benefits.28 
Even if evidence suggests that it is not entirely appropriate for utilities to administer public funds, no 
other implementing agency appropriately able to do this usually exists. While it has been suggested 
that energy service companies (ESCOs) take on this role, the facts remain: ESCOs are usually 
private companies, profit-oriented, only able to undertake activities that make a direct contribution 
to the financial performance of the concern, and probably less suited to this activity than are public-
owned utilities. 
Regulatory authorities around the world have generally dealt with these concerns by requiring that 
utilities undertake some public benefit energy-efficiency programmes but that mechanisms are put in 
place to ensure that this investment is genuine, and does not just look good on paper. 
Recommendations that follow in this section assume that this type of course of action will be taken 
in South Africa - that distributor utilities will be required to undertake some amount of public benefit 
energy-efficiency investment, and will be given regulatory and governance support to do so. 
Clearly, the role of Eskom, municipal distributors, and at some future stage REDs, will be to 
implement public benefit energy-efficiency programmes. Less clearly, these distributors are and will 
be in strong positions to lobby government and the NER for the establishment of a context 
conducive towards investment in energy-efficiency investment. 
7.2 Implementation to support energy efficiency 
7.2.1 Eskom should continue to develop capacity to undertake energy-efficiency DSM 
activities 
Of all distributors, Eskom's Distribution Group (in particular, the Marketing Group) has had the most 
experience in designing and implementing public benefit energy-efficiency programmes in South 
Africa. This is not only due to Eskom's monopoly status but also because of the benefits it has been 
able to derive because it is a vertically integrated utility. Eskom's extensive experience - which in 
effect is national experience- in this area must continue to grow. 
We recommend that, in addition to growing its capabilities in DSM 
implementation, Eskom must also begin to transfer its skills and experience in 
this area to other municipal distributors. 
The rationale for this is two-fold. Firstly, it is important, for the success of Eskom's public benefit 
energy-efficiency programmes, that municipalities are on board. Municipal distributors are one of 
South Africa's key delivery channels of these programmes. Without their participation, programmes 
of this nature have very little chance of succeeding. In light of government plans for the 
rationalisation of the EDI, it makes sense, secondly, that Eskom transfer skills in this area to 
municipal distributors. Indeed, government's model is to remove distribution from Eskom, and to 
amalgamate it with a small number of REDs which also include regional local authority groupings. 
Because, in the foreseeable future, Eskom Distribution and local authorities will be working side-by-
side, it makes sense for skills transfer to occur sooner rather than later. 
Eskom could transfer skills in this area to municipal distributors in two different ways. Firstly, it could 
work with municipalities on specific initiatives - the most obvious current one being the Efficient 
28 'Public funds' generally refer to those collected through a non-bypassable systemwide public benefits surcharge 
as described in section 6.3.2 above. 
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Lighting Initiative. One of the objectives of ELI should be to work with municipalities, not just to 
ensure that this channel for delivery is working fluidly, but also to ensure that municipalities gain 
knowledge and skills in this area in the process. A second way in which Eskom could transfer skills in 
this area is through national or regional workshops organised with a specific mandate to provide 
training/skills transfer in various areas, including financing arrangements, programme design, project 
management, training programmes, project implementation, community participation and so on. 
7 .2.2 Eskom and municipal distributors should seek to strengthen capacity in 
delivering public benefit energy-efficiency programmes 
There are two broad reasons why Eskom and municipal distributions should seek to develop 
capacity and programmes in this area. First and most important, public benefit energy-efficiency 
programmes deliver real and positive benefits to society. The delivery of these public benefits can 
only improve relationships between service providers' and customers. Energy-efficiency services are 
also an important way in which service providers can mutually differentiate the service that they 
provide. This 'edge' is particularly useful when competition is introduced into the retail industry, and 
thus when retailers compete against each other for business. Secondly, while the regulatory 
framework to be employed by the NER in the future is uncertain, it is likely that it may involve some 
benchmarking (or comparative regulatory) practice. If some municipal distributors or REDs are 
conducting successful public benefit energy-efficiency programmes, then it will be expected that 
others should do the same. 
7.3 Funding options to support energy efficiency 
It is likely that if the NER requires municipalities, Eskom or REDs to invest in public benefit energy-
efficiency programmes, then it will also put in place mechanisms to support this investment. 
'Funding' mechanisms could include decoupling mechanisms (profits are de-linked from 
sales/revenues), or net lost revenue adjustment mechanisms (net lost revenues are compensated for 
through tariff adjustments). The NER might also seek to establish a public benefits surcharge that 
would be used to finance aspects of these public benefit energy-efficiency programmes (see section 
6 above). Institutional mechanisms adopted by the NER might include the establishment of a 
National Energy Efficiency Agency, or the support of the DME. 
The finances that municipal distributors, Eskom and, later, REDs will need to raise will, of course, 
depend on the mechanisms - if any - that the NER chooses to adopt. If the NER adopts net lost 
revenue adjustment mechanisms, distributors will not have to find funds to compensate the utility for 
lost revenues. If the NER introduces a public benefits surcharge, it is likely that this will be used for 
programme implementation (not start-up or overhead costs, but rather costs directly associated with 
the implementation of energy-efficiency programmes). The NER might also allow utilities to recover 
programme costs in the form of periodic tariff adjustments. It is unlikely, however, that the NER will 
introduce all of these mechanisms. This means that distributors will have to seek out funds to 
support cost components that are not addressed. In addition, depending on how frequently tariffs 
are reviewed, utilities might need to seek out bridging finance for programmes. 
Distributors should keep in mind that the spin-off effects of these programmes could more than 
compensate distributors for costs incurred. These spin-off effects include an increased ability for 
utilities to retain and grow its customer base, and significantly improve customer services. 
7.4 Lobbying to support energy efficiency 
7.4.1 Eskom should begin to market the 'energy efficiency' concept to other municipal 
distributors 
As noted previously, Eskom Distribution has probably had the most experience of all distributors in 
designing and implementing public benefit energy-efficiency programmes. It was also noted that 
Eskom should begin to transfer skills and expertise to municipal distributors. Because energy-
efficiency programmes often result in a negative revenue impact for distributors, they are generally 
loath to voluntarily undertake these programmes. Thus, it would be important for Eskom, prior to 
any skills transfer activities, to work with municipalities to explain how energy-efficiency programmes 
can result in benefits to distributor utilities. This could be done in various ways, the most obvious 
being for Eskom to assist municipal distributors in undertaking economic analyses of the impact of 
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energy-efficiency investments, and thereafter conducting examinations of the results/implications of 
the analyses. 
7.4.2 Eskom and municipal distributors should lobby the NER and govern111,ent for 
environments conducive to investment in energy efficiency , 
If the NER makes it a requirement that Eskom, municipal distributors and/or REDs undertake a 
minimum level of investment in energy efficiency, then it will be iri the distribution industry's 
interests to ensure that the 'environment' in which they will be operating is conducive to such 
investment. As the NER moves on the development of policy in this area, we recommend that the 
distribution industry lobby for the establishment of a conducive environment. 
As noted in Section 6 above, there are various ways in which the NER can support investment in 
energy efficiency. Firstly, it can establish mechanisms to support programme costs (overhead costs 
etc). Secondly, through net lost revenue adjustment or decoupling mechanisms, it can allow 
distributors to recover lost revenues associated with energy-efficiency programmes. Thirdly, a public 
benefits surcharge can be established. This surcharge would be collected directly from customers on 
a per customer or energy usage basis and would be utilised to pay for the implementation of energy-
efficiency programmes (and not programme costs). The distribution industry should now lobby for 
the establishment of one or more of these mechanisms: we are of the opinion that this is one of the 
most important activities that it could currently engage in. Short-term efforts could have considerable 
longer-term benefits. 
7.4.3 The distribution industry should lobby for the establishment of a National Energy 
Efficiency Agency 
If, in the future, the NER requires it of the distribution industry that a minimum level of investment in 
energy efficiency is undertaken, then it will be in the interests of this industry to lobby for the 
establishment of a National Energy Efficiency Agency (see section 5.2.2 above), which could be of 
great assistance to municipal distributors, Eskom and/or REDs in implementing these investments. 
Important roles of the National Energy Efficiency Agency vis-a-vis energy-efficiency investment by 
the distribution industry include: 
• assisting the distribution industry in identifying energy-efficiency programmes consistent 
with the standards of performance of the NER; 
developing generic education and awareness campaigns which can be utilised by the 
distribution industry; 
• supporting communication between the distribution industry and the NER and 
government. 
• 
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Appendix A 
Energy efficiency policies and progress (1998 - 2000) 
POLICY PROGRESS (as of May 2000) 
Energy efficiency in industry and commerce 
Government will promote an energy efficiency • Green Buildings for Africa is progressing (CSIA, 
awareness amongst industrial and commercial IIEC, DME) 
energy consumers, and will encourage the use of 
• EU ETSU Project with the title 'Industrial Energy 
energy efficient practices by this sector Efficiency Information Dissemination Phase 2' will 
provide case studies which will create awareness. 
Government will establish energy efficiency norms • South Africa Energy and Demand Efficiency 
and standards for commercial buildings Standard (SAEDES) has been completed and is 
with SABS technical committees to become a 
mandatory standard in due course. A project to 
investigate the feasibility of and savings obtained 
by implementing the SAEDES is progressing well. 
• Market survey (assessing potential savings) of the 
pulp and paper industry has been undertaken 
• Green Buildings for Africa is progressing (CSIA, 
IIEC, DME) 
Government will promote the performance of audits, ,_. EU ETSU as above 
demonstrations, information dissemination, sectoral 
• Energy and Efficiency Educational Material for the analyses and training programmes 
Curricula at Primary, Secondary and Tertiary and 
Industrial Levels is being developed 
Government will establish energy efficiency • No progress 
standards for industrial equipment 
Government will implement an energy-efficiency • No progress 
programme to reduce consumption in its installations 
Energy efficiency in households 
Government will promote energy efficiency • Energy Week (May 1999) created awareness 
awareness in households and will facilitate the 
• Environmentally Sound Low-Cost Housing Task establishment of relevant standards and codes of 
practice for the thermal performance of dwellings, the Team has inputted into a Minimum Norms and 
inclusion thereof in the national buildings' codes, and Standards document on low-cost housing 
will promote their implementation through appropriate 
measures. 
A programme of education will be initiated for • No progress 
decision-makers such as designers, financiers, 
builders and home-owners, dealing with the costs 
and benefits of building dwellings with good thermal 
performance 
Government will promote the introduction of a • Dealt with in working document by National 
domestic appliance-labelling programme Domestic Energy Efficiency (NADEE) Task Team 
(Energy Efficiency Enterprises) 
• Programme has been transferred to the 
Department of Trade and Industry under Ms Busi 
Chauke. 
Energy efficiency in transport 
The DME will advise other government departments, • The vehicles emissions project phase 3 is currently 
particularly the Departments of Transport and in progress 
Finance, on the energy efficiency implications of • No other progress 
alternative transport modes and public transport 
subsidy policies, and will provide assistance in the 
formulation of fiscal and transport policies to promote 
energy conservation and efficiency. 
The DME will provide information on the fuel use • A SADC Petroleum Sub-Committee has been 
characteristics of new vehicles established to look at fuel standards and 
specifications for the entire SADC region. 
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Energy efficiency and government capacity 
Government will investigate the establishment of • Current proposal to open up a Deputy Director post 
appropriate institutional arrangements infrastructure in the DME for Energy Efficiency and the 
and capacity for the implementation of energy Environment (in directorate of Energy Planning). 
efficiency strategies. 
• Development of a business plan for an Energy 
Efficiency Agency (LHA Management Consultants) 
Table A1: Government policies related to energy efficiency 
Source: DME {1998); Du Toit (2000) 
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Appendix B 
Natural evolution of the energy services industry 
Primary Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
focus Conservation Programmatic Private energy Convergent services 
Price reform efficiency services with energy as the 
Resource allocation DSM 
integrating catalyst 
Activities New regulations, Use of utilities as Project orientation Value creation rather 
codes and standards implementing agents Some variant of than cost savings is 
Setting savings goals of change performance driving business 
and targets Formal programmes contracting decision 
'Command and with incentivised Success still denoted Energy and non-
control' (i.e. active measures in financial terms (i.e. energy services 
load management) Formal monitoring paybacks, IRA) bundled to provide 
and evaluation increased comfort, 'Carrot approaches' Vendors/ manu- convenience, 
(i.e. incentives, moral 'Success' facturers/ actively productivity or 
suasion for voluntary denominated almost enter service/ competitive 
actions) exclusively as cost technology delivery advantage 
'Shock cushioning' savings or avoided chain. Maximum use of 
(i.e. providing outlays strategic alliances to 
protection for affected Reliance on paid create 'virtual' system 
sectors less able to contracts versus integrators 
cope with rapid strategic 
IT permeates changes) allies/business 
partners integrated solution 
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Appendix C 
NLRAs, decoupling and balancing accounts 
Cost-of-service or rate-of-return regulation 
According to this approach (which is widely adopted in the United States) tariffs are set so that 
the revenues from retail sales of electricity will cover the full costs of supplying that electricity, 
including generation, transmission and distribution costs, plus a fair rate of return on 
investment. New plant costs are not included into the tariffs until commercial operation, when 
costs are placed into the 'rate base' and become part of the total cost of services to be 
recovered by the tariff. A crucial step in this process is the determination that costs are 
'prudently' incurred and that the projects are 'used and useful'. 
The drawback of this method is that it does not provide the regulated utility with any incentive 
to minimise costs. If a utility is guaranteed revenues sufficient to cover its reasonably regulated 
costs, and furthermore, it its efforts to reduce the costs result in a commensurate reduction in 
utility revenue, the a utility has little incentive to reduce costs. 
This approach allows utilities to recover DSM programme costs but discourages them from 
pursuing customer energy-efficiency programmes because: 
(i) utilities were not allowed to recover DSM programme expenses when. these expenses 
have not been included in a previous tariff-setting process; 
(ii) utilities lost revenues from successful customer energy-efficiency programmes; and 
(iii) utilities lost earnings opportunities because resources were devoted to DSM 
programmes rather than to other profit making activities. 
This approach is criticised because in allowing utilities to recover the cost of DSM programmes 
through tariff increases, it amounted to DSM programmes being funded through a broad tax on 
all customers, thus benefiting a particular group of customers at the expense of others. 
Performance-based regulatory approach 
As part of an ongoing debate about competition in the electric utility industry, regulators are 
increasingly considering performance-based approach as an alternative to traditional rate-of-
return regulation. It is hoped that performance-based regulation will enable regulators to: 
(i) provide more direct incentives for utilities to lower electricity costs 
(ii) reduce the price disparities between high- and low-cost electricity producers, and 
(iii) reduce the level of regulatory oversight of the electric utility planning process. 
PBR mechanisms can be designed in a variety of different ways - each providing different 
signals and incentives to utilities. The mechanisms usually fall within two general categories: 
price caps and revenue targets. 
Price caps 
With price-cap mechanism, electricity tariffs are set by the regulator at an initial level sufficient 
for the utility to recover its costs plus a reasonable profit. Over a certain period (e.g. five to six 
years), the utility would be allowed to increase its prices only to account for inflation, net of 
some allowance for increased productivity. If the utility can keep its cost increases below the net 
effect of inflation and productivity, then it can keep the difference as profits. If the utility's costs 
escalate at a rate greater than inflation net of productivity, then its profits will suffer. · 
Price caps provide utilities with a powerful incentive to increase electricity sales, because 
additional units of sales will translate into additional profits, and lost sales will tum into lost 
profits. Therefore price caps create strong disincentives to DSM and incentives to promote load 
building. Price cap fixes allowed electricity prices for longer periods of time than generally 
occurs with traditional tariffmaking. 
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To partially remove this DSM disincentive, regulators in England and Wales initiated a 
'decoupling' of volume sales from profits. According to this approach, the volume-related 
element of the revenue allowance was reduced by half for both supply price and distribution 
price cap mechanisms. 
Revenue targets 
With revenue targets, the regulator begins by setting an allowed level of revenues based on 
actual costs. Electricity prices are then derived from the allowed revenues and the expected 
level of sales. Over time, the allowed revenues can be adjusted to account for inflation and 
productivity, similar to price-cap mechanisms. If revenues deviate significantly from those 
forecast, the difference will be returned to, or recovered from, ratepayers through periodic 
adjustments. This reconciliation process differentiates revenue targets from price caps, and 
ensures that there are no windfall profits and losses due to unanticipated changes in sales. The 





GRC1 Yr1 0.100 
Yr2 0.100 
GRC2 Yr3 0.110 
B c D E F G 
Expected Authorise Price Collected Revenue Reported 
sales d revenue {RikWh) sales {Rs) revenue 
(kWh) (Rs) {kWh) (Rs) 
1000 100.00 0.100 1100 110.00 100.00 
1000 100.00 0.090 990 89.10 100.00 
1010 111.10 0.111 1010 112.00 111.10 
Table A2: Basic example of a balancing account 








Assume that this mechanism operates in a region with a two-years general rate-case cycle and 
no other between-rate-case revenue adjustments. The basic mechanism requires three sets of 
numbers to track revenue and price. Columns A-C are established in the general rate case and 
remain fixed until the next general rate-case. Columns D-F represent what actually occurs 
during each year. Columns G-I represent the numbers that the utility reports in its income 
statements 
Year 1: General rate case no 1 {GRC1) authorises revenue of R100 based on expected sales of 
1 000 kWh. During the year, the utility sells 1100 kWh at R0.10 kWh, resulting in a collected 
revenue of R110. The mechanism ensures that the utility will only keep the authorised revenue 
of R100. Thus,- R10 is placed into the balancing account. 
Year 2: Authorised revenue of R100 and expected sales of 1 000 kWh are still in effect from 
GRC1. In addition, the utility must return R10 to ratepayers from the previous year's over-
collection. Accordingly, if the utility collects R90 this year, it will even with the ratepayers. So. 
the Year 2 price of R0.09/kWh is calculated by dividing the total revenue that the utility needs 
to collect (R90) by expected sales {still 1000kWh). However, in this case, the utility sells less 
electricity than expected, resulting in a collected revenue of R100, which covers the R89.10 
collected from ratepayers this year, the R10 extra that was collected from ratepayers last year, 
and R0.90 that appears in the balancing account, representing money that the ratepayers will 
now owe the utility in Year 3 
Year 3: As a result of General Rate Case 2, authorised revenue has increased to R110.10 based 
on the expected sales of 1010 kWh. In addition, the utility is allowed to collect R0.90 from 
ratepayers because of the previous years' shortfall. Accordingly, it the utility collec~s R112 this 
year, it will be even with ratepayers. Thus, the Year 3 price of R0.11/kWh is calculated by 
dividing the total revenue that the utility wants to collect {R112) by the expected sales {now 1 
010 kWh). As it turns out, actual sales match expected sales, resulting in collected revenues of 
Rl12. The utility reports revenue of R111.10 for Year 3 and the difference in the balancing 
account {R0.90) means the utility has recovered the previous year's shortfall. 
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In the United States, regulators seek to achieve revenue targets through the use of net-lost 
revenue adjustments (NLRAs). These adjustments (used together with decoupling mechanisms) 
are intended to remove the disincentives associated with traditional rate-of-return regulation. 
Decoupling sales from revenues and profits. 
Regulatory tariff structures often link energy sales (kWh) with utility revenues and profits, which 
is a clear disincentive for the utility to engage in any DSM that reduces sales. As a means of 
overcoming this disincentive, regulatory authorities can design the rate structure such that the 
income to the utility is not dependent on sales volume (in kWh) but on some other measure of 
service (such as growth in number of customers). In other words, instead of letting revenues 
grow with increasing kWh sales, decoupling allows revenues to grow with other factors that are 
independent of changes in actual electricity use. Decoupling ensures that actual revenues 
exactly match an established revenue requirement, regardless of the sales level. Every 
decoupling mechanism consists of two parts. First, all decoupling mechanisms use balancing 
accounts to guarantee the exact collection of authorised revenues over time. Second, all 
decoupling mechanisms work in conjunction with an explicit method for changing the level of 
authorised revenue during years between general tariff reviews. 
Net-lost revenue adjustments 
NLRAs are designed to compensate utilities for changes in revenues associated with utility DSM 
programmes. To implement an NLRA, the utility first estimates the energy and load reductions 
caused by its DSM programmes for the year in question. These GWh- and MW- savings are 
then multiplied by the difference between retail price and short-term costs (both energy and 
capacity) and the two products (lost energy and lost capacity revenues) are added together. 
This sum is the net lost revenues caused by the utility's DSM programme. It is called 'net' 
because it is equal to the difference between the reduction in utility revenue minus the 
reduction in utility cost (fuel and variable 0 & M costs).29 
Generally, decoupling is likely to be appropriate for utilities that run (or plan to run) large DSM 
programmes and for which the difference between retail price and short-term costs is large. 
Decoupling also makes sense where the regulator only has limited staff resources to monitor the 
utility's DSM programmes. NLRAs, which are more narrowly focused than decoupling, tend to 
encourage utilities to operate DSM programmes that look good on paper but fail to produced 
energy savings in practice (Hirst & Blank 1994). Thus NLRAs are probably best suited for 
utilities that operate only small programmes, or where the difference between price and short 
run marginal costs is small. Both of these factors reduce the amount of money flowing through 
the NLRA and relieve some of the problems associated with evaluation and definition of energy 
savings (Hirst & Blank 1994). 
29 
Decoupling 
Removes incentives to sell more electricity and all 
DSM disincentives 
Does not require evaluation 
Utility does not profit from DSM programmes that 
produce less than expected energy savings 
Compensates utilities for fixed DSM costs 
Eliminates utility disincentive to support public 
policies that increase efficiency (i.e. rate design, 
efficiency standards and education programmes) 
Net-lost-revenue adjustments 
Removes some DSM disincentives (extra sales 
caused by load-building programmes benefit 
shareholders) 
Requires sophisticated and precise evaluation 
methods and results 
Utility may profit from DSM programmes that save 
less than expected 
Compensates utilities for fixed and variable costs 
Continues utility disincentives to support public 
policies that increase energy efficiency 
Table A3: Comparison of decoupling and net-lost revenue adjustment mechanisms 
Source: Moskovitz, Harrington & Austin (1992) 
For a more detailed account of NLRAs see Baxter (1995), Hirst and Blank (1994). 
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Mechanisms to provide additional DSM incentives 
The following mechanisms have been used in the United States to provide utilities with 
additional incentives to invest in DSM. Note that these incentives have been applied to 
investor-owned (as opposed to public-owned) utilities. Note also that hybrids of these 
mechanisms are also sometimes used.30 
• Shared-savings mechanisms. The shared-savings incentive mechanism provides utility 
shareholders with a share of the energy savings benefits, or 'net benefits'. Shared savings 
are the most common mechanism used to reward utilities for investing in DSM 
programmes. 
• Bonus mechanisms. Bonus mechanisms reward utility shareholders on a per-unit basis for 
energy and demand savings. They are less common than shared savings. 
• Mark-up mechanisms. Mark-up mechanisms provide a mark-up on DSM programme 
expenditures. generally varying from five to ten per cent. Mark-up mechanisms frequently 
apply to a subset of utility programmes, where energy savings benefits are particularly 
difficult to measure (i.e. information programmes) or where the programmes undertaken 
are based on equity rather than efficiency considerations (Eto, Stoft & Kito 1998). 
These performance-based reforms mark a distinct motion towards eliminating the bias between 
the utility's incentive to build power plants and its incentive to invest in efficiency: Despite this, 
cost-of-services regulation is still used to treat of utility investment in plant and equipment. Cost 
of services regulation is thus likely to continue to bias utility decisions governing investment 
capital. 
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Appendix D 
Synthesis of recommendations and barriers addressed 
Recommendation Barrier addressed 
Recommendations to government 
If government is to be seen to be a credible leader in 
the area of energy efficiency, then it must fulfil its 
commitments as detailed in the White Paper on 
Energy Policy for South Africa (1998) 
The proposal to re-introduce a position dedicated 
towards energy efficiency and environmental issues 
must be adopted and implemented as soon as 
possible. Like environmental issues, capacity 
building and black economic empowerment, energy 
efficiency should be treated as a cross-cutting issue 
and should not be associated with just electricity but 
rather with energy in general. 
The function of DME's energy efficiency and 
environmental position is to facilitate the creation of 
an enabling environment for public benefit energy-
efficiency in South Africa, and not to become 
involved in in-depth implementation activities linked 
with the energy services industry. 
Government initiate a second (this time, more in-
depth) feasibility study of a National Energy 
Efficiency Agency. This feasibility study should take 
into account the likely implications power sector 
restructuring will have on investment in public 
benefit energy-efficiency programmes. 
Government should continue to develop its work on 
standards and codes for energy efficiency. The DME 
should initiate/co-ordinate this programme. 
Government and the NER must work together to 
create an environment that encourages energy-
efficiency investments. 
The proposal to establish a full-time post dedicated 
towards energy efficiency should be adopted on 
condition that one of the posts main objectives is to 
ensure that the DME work closely with the NER on 
energy-efficiency related issues. 
• Government is currently not seen to be a leader 
in the area of energy efficiency. 
• Resource constraints limit the priority list of 
government. 
• The government's organisational structure does 
not support energy-efficiency investment. 
• Government is currently not seen to be a leader 
in the area of energy efficiency. 
• Government does not have the current capacity 
to be involved in implementation on a large-scale. 
• Neither government nor the NER has the current 
capacity to administer, initiate and implement 
public benefit energy-efficiency programmes. Yet, 
the need clearly remains for these programmes. 
• Substantial private sector participation will 
probably not occur until investment in the energy 
services industry is seen to be less risky. 
• Links in the supply chain to deliver energy 
efficiency are not yet in place. 
• 'Twice-bitten, thrice shy barriers'. 
• In existence is a light-handed regulatory 
approach still to require and enforce energy-
efficiency investment. 
• Lack of co-ordination between government and 
the NER because there is currently no energy 
efficiency post within the DME. 
• As competition is introduced into the power 
sector, tools to support energy-efficiency 
investment are less easy to develop and employ. 
• There is a lack of co-ordination and 
communication between government and the 
NER in the area of energy efficiency. 
• This is probably the case because there is 
currently no energy efficiency post within the 
DME to ensure that this occurs. 
Recommendations to the NER 
The NER must make a decision on whether it will 
seek to support investment in public benefit energy 
efficiency. Broadly, thus would entail the creation of 
a regulatory framework in which supply- and 
demand- investments are both valued and therefore 
considered. 
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• Currently, there is confusion about what position 
the NER will hold in this regard. This uncertainty 
may result in a decline in investment in energy 
efficiency: the distribution industry is not sure 
whether the NER will support these efforts. 
• Demand-related investments are not currently not 
I 
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Recommendation Barrier addressed 
given due consideration. 
The NER should play a lead role in the development • Currently, public benefit energy-efficiency 
of a culture that values investment in public benefit programmes are not high on the agenda of the 
energy-efficiency investment. This should be done electricity industry. Utilities are generally supply-
through close involvement in policy development side oriented and staff are of the opinion that 
and advocacy in this area, but through leaving the DSM is 'yet to prove itself'. 
various supportive, enforcement, monitoring and • Neither the NER nor overnment have the capacity 
evaluatory functions, as well as implementation of to grow the energy services industry to the extent public benefit programmes, to the National Energy that is necessary. 
Efficiency Agency. 
Through decoupling and other mechanisms, the • There is a danger that utilities allowed revenues 
NER should seek to ensure that utility profits are not will be based on sales. 
linked to revenues and sales. 
The NER should develop 'Standards of • If the NER does not require the distribution 
Performance' which detail the nature and value of industry to invest in public benefit energy 
the minimum energy-efficiency investments which efficiency, it is unlikely that this investment will be 
municipal distributors or REDs would be obliged to made. This is because distributors' top priority is 
take responsibility for. The NER should assess sales maximisation. 
different stipulations of this requirement (for • Competing priorities detract from investing in 
instance, through total annual revenues, distributed DSM 
energy, customer base etc.). 
• If a minimal amount of energy efficiency is 
required by the NER, then it is likely that utilities 
will seek to implement energy-efficiency 
programmes which are in their interests to do so 
and will avoid other programmes. In addition, it is 
likely that many 'so-called' energy-efficiency 
investments will be token investments that do not 
achieve desired results. 
The NER should develop in-house capacity to • Currently the NER does not have adequate 
ensure that the minimum energy efficiency numbers of staff to justify taking on additional 
requirements meet criteria as detailed in the support and verification activities. 
Standards of Performance or the NER retain the 
services of the proposed National Energy Efficiency 
Agency to do so. 
The NER should undertake a critical assessment of • Currently, there are no incentives for distributor 
net lost revenue adjustment (NLRA) mechanisms. utilities to undertake investment in public benefit 
This assessment should include investigations of the energy-efficiency programmes. To do so, utilities 
economic, administrative and institutional must forgo lost revenue, pay for programme costs 
implications of establishing such a mechanism. The and implementation costs. 
decision whether the NER should establish NLRAs 
• There is currently inadequate information to either should be linked closely with the decision whether 
recommend or reject the NLRA mechanism. the NER supports the establishment of the public 
benefits surcharge. Even through the NLRA and the 
public benefits surcharge would finance different 
aspects of utilities' energy-efficiency investment, it is 
recommended that the NER does not do both. 
The NER should not allow utilities to profit from • The NER does not have the capacity to 
energy-efficiency investments either through mark- administer these mechanisms. 
up or bonus mechanisms • These mechanisms can invite regulatory abuse 
and programmes that look good on paper but do 
not achieve the desired results. 
The NER should undertake a detailed analysis of a • Currently, there are no incentives for distributor 
potential public benefits surcharge. The analysis utilities to undertake investment in public benefit 
should investigate (I) how this public benefits charge energy-efficiency programmes. To do so, utilities 
should be collected and spent; (ii) what the charge must forgo lost revenue, pay for programme costs 
per customer should be in order that adequate funds and implementation costs. 
can be raised; (iii) what this charge should be spent • There is currently inadequate information to either 
on (energy efficiency, research and development, recommend or reject the NLRA mechanism. 
renewable energy etc.) 
The NER must begin now to test regulatory • South Africa has had no experience in this area. 
mechanisms to promote public benefit energy- • International experience is useful but must be 
efficiency programmes. tried and tested. 
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Recommendation Barrier addressed 
The NER should work closely with the government 
in the area of energy efficiency 
• There is inadequate communication between the 
NER and the DME in the area of energy 
efficiency. 
Recommendations to Eskom and municipal distributors 
Eskom and municipal distributors should continue to • South Africa has had relatively little experience in 
develop capacity to undertake and deliver energy this area. 
efficiency DSM activities • Even if regulatory and governance mechanisms 
In addition to growing its capabilities in DSM 
implementation, Eskom must also begin to transfer 
its skills/experiences in this area to other municipal 
distributors 
Eskom and municipal distributors should lobby the 
NER and Government for environments conducive 
to investment in energy efficiency 
The distribution industry should lobby for the 
establishment of a National Energy Agency 
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are put in place to support energy-efficiency 
investment, there will be no success in this area if 
the delivery channels are not functioning. 
• Methodology to evaluate DSM is inconsistent. 
• As above. 
• Municipal distributors have generally had less 
experience in this area than has Eskom. 
• Smaller municipalities cannot reap 'economies of 
scale' benefits of DSM. 
• Highly specialised skills are in short supply. 
• A comprehensive regulatory framework is 
currently not yet in place. 
• There are currently no national structures to 
support national energy-efficiency investment. 
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Appendix E 
Robustness of recommendations 
Recommendation Comment on robustness/applicability of 
recommendation 
Recommendations to government 
If government is to be seen to be a credible leader in • Strategy for current implementation 
the area of energy efficiency, then it must fulfil its 
• Positions government for the future commitments as detailed in the White Paper on Energy 
Policy for South Africa {1998) 
The proposal to re-introduce a position dedicated • Strategy for current implementation 
towards energy efficiency and environmental issues • Positions government for the future must be adopted and implemented as soon as possible. 
Like environmental issues, capacity building and black 
economic empowerment, energy efficiency should be 
treated as a cross-cutting issue and should not be 
associated with just electricity but rather with energy in 
general. 
The function of DME's energy efficiency and • Strategy for current implementation 
environmental position is to facilitate the creation of an 
• Positions government strategically enabling environment for public benefit energy 
efficiency in South Africa, and not to become involved in 
in-depth implementation activities linked with the energy 
services industry. 
Government initiate a second (this time, more in-depth) • Strategy for current implementation 
feasibility study of a National Energy Efficiency Agency. 
• The establishment of a public-sector National This feasibility study should take into account the likely 
Energy Efficiency Agency will help to remove implications power sector restructuring will have on 
capacity constraints within government and investment in public benefit energy-efficiency 
the NER, as well as create a natural 'home' programmes. 
for energy efficiency as the power sector is 
restructured. Without an independent Agency 
to support this process, it is unlikely that any 
significant investment will be made. 
Government should continue and develop its work on • Strategy for current implementation, in 
standards and codes for energy efficiency. The DME preparation for future positioning 
should initiate/co-ordinate this programme. 
• Standards and codes are important now, but 
will become increasingly important as more 
competition is introduced into the power 
sector. This is because fewer regulatory tools 
will be at hand to protect energy-efficiency 
investment. 
Government and the NER must work together to create • As more competition is introduced, energy-
an environment that encourages energy-efficiency efficiency investment will likely decline. Thus, 
investments. it will become increasingly important for 
government and the NER to collaborate in this 
area to create an integrated framework. 
The proposal to establish a full-time post dedicated • As above 
towards energy efficiency should be adopted on the 
condition that one of the post's main objectives is to 
ensure that the DME work closely with the NER on 
energy-efficiency related issues. 
Recommendations to the NER 
The NER must make a decision on whether it will seek 
to support investment in public benefit energy efficiency. 
Broadly, thus would entail the creation of a regulatory. 
framework in which supply- and demand- investments 
are both valued and therefore considered. 
The NER should Ia a lead role in the develo ment of 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
• For action in the short-term. The electricity 
industry is soon to undergo considerable 
change. Industry players are demanding more 
decisiveness and clarity from the NER. 
• Making a decision on this will assist the NER 
in developing an overall longer-term strategy. 
• As com etition is introduced into the electricit 
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Recommendation Comment on robustness/applicability of 
recommendation 
a culture that values investment in public benefit industry, investment in energy efficiency is 
energy-efficiency investment. This should be done likely to decline. It becomes increasingly 
through close involvement in policy development and difficult to provide incentives to ensure such 
advocacy in this area, but through leaving the various investment. A culture in which energy 
supportive, enforcement, monitoring and evaluatory efficiency is deemed to be worthwhile could 
functions, as well as implementation of public benefit have more sustainable and ongoing positive 
programmes, to the National Energy Efficiency Agency. impact than any regulatory or legislative tool. 
Through decoupling and other mechanisms, the NER • Decoupling mechanisms begin to lose 
should seek to ensure that utility profits are not linked to impetus when competition is introduced into 
revenues and sales. the retail industry (i.e. when retail and 
distribution businesses are de-linked and 
retail is deregulated. Often it is easier for 
Regulators to implement a DSM surcharge, or 
minimal DSM investment obligations to 
overcome the disincentives to invest in energy 
efficiency. 
The NER should develop Standards of Performance • This strategy is robust in all electricity 
which detail the nature and value of the minimum contexts i.e. when competition for electricity 
energy-efficiency investments which municipal services is offered at both wholesale and 
distributors or REDs would be obliged to take retail levels 
responsibility for. The NER should assess different 
stipulations of this requirement (for instance, through 
total annual revenues, distributed energy, customer 
base etc.). 
The NER should develop in-house capacity to ensure • Positioning NER for the future when 
that the minimum energy efficiency requirements meet competition is introduced into the power 
criteria as detailed in the Standards of Performance or sector. 
the NER retain the services of the proposed National 
• Developing capacity to 'understand' energy-Energy Efficiency Agency to do so. 
efficiency programmes undertaken by the 
distribution industry. 
The NER should undertake a critical assessment of net • NLRA mechanisms would be useful in current 
lost revenue adjustment (NLRA) mechanisms. This contexts but less useful when competition is 
assessment should include investgations of the introduced into the retail industry. NLRA 
economic, administrative and institutional implications of mechanisms could be employed now, but 
establishing such a mechanism. The decision whether should be supported by other regulatory 
the NER should establish NLRAs should be linked requirements/incentives in the longer term. 
closely with the decision whether the NER supports the 
establishment of the public benefits surcharge. Even 
through the NLRA an<;! the public benefits surcharge 
would finance different aspects of utilities' energy-
efficiency investment, it is recommended that the NER 
does not do both. 
The NER should not allow utilities to profit from energy- • Allowing utilities to profit from energy 
efficiency investments either through mark-up or bonus efficiency could result in excessive DSM 
mechanisms. investments that look good on paper and do 
no more. 
• The NER does not have the capacity now to 
administer these mechanisms. 
The NER should undertake a detailed analysis of a • Effective way of collecting funding for energy-
potential public benefits surcharge. The analysis should efficiency investment 
investigate (I) how this public benef.its charge should be 
• Useful in most power sector contexts collected and spent; (ii) what the charge per customer 
should be in order that adequate funds can be raised; • Short-term strategy will be to learn about this 
(iii) what this charge should be spent on (energy surcharge, while the long-term strategy will be 
efficiency, research and development, renewable to implement it. 
energy etc.) 
The NER must begin now to test regulatory • Positioning for the future. 
mechanisms to promote public benefit energy-efficiency 
programmes. 
The NER should work closely with the government in • As more competition is introduced, the NER 
the area of energy efficiency will have fewer mechanisms at hand to 
encouraqe enerqv-efficiency investment. 
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Recommendation Comment on robustness/applicability of 
recommendation 
Collaboration with government will be 
important if an integrated public sector 
strategy is to be developed. 
Recommendations to Eskom and municipal distributors 
Eskom and municipal distributors should continue to • Positioning now for longer-term benefit by 
develop capacity to undertake and deliver energy distribution industry. This will be especially 
efficiency DSM activities important if the NER requires a minimum 
amount of energy-efficiency investment. 
In addition to growing its capabilities in DSM • As above. 
implementation, Eskom must also begin to transfer its 
skills/experiences in this area to other municipal 
distributors 
Eskom and municipal distributors should lobby the NER • As above. 
and Government for environments conducive to 
investment in energy efficiency 
The distribution industry should lobby for the • As above. 
establishment of a National Energy Agency 
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Presentation: Preliminary recommendations to 
government 
Electricity industry restructuring and 
implications for investments in DSM 
• International review 
• Barriers inhibiting investment in DSM in South Africa 
• ESt scenarios and implications for DSM 
• Becommendatjons to goyeroment NEB and Eskom 
• Fund jog optjons for DSM 
• Synthesis 
Energy & Development Research Cl!fltre DSM andEStraslructurlog 
Industry-wide recommendations on positioning 
DSM in new electricity industry contexts 
• Aecommendatjons to goyeroment (creating enabling 
environment, areas of priority, institutional framework) 
• Recommendations to NEB (regylatory regjme and 
regylatorv mechaojsmsl 
• Recommendations to Eskom and distributors (reducing 
utility barriers) 
Energv & DeV&!Optmnl RMearch Cenlru OSM andEStrestruct'"'g 
Lessons from international experience 
• The public sector's role in encouraging optimal 
investment in energy efficiency is critical 
• "Rules of the game" should be established prior to 
restructuring and should apply "right from the start" 
• It is not clear whether utilities should continue to 
administer DSM programmes 
• Secured funding and independence are critical success 
factors for public agencies/programmes dedicated 
towards promoting energy efficiency 
• IRP not enough 
"Top-down" planning approach versus a 
"bottom-up" approach 
• implications of this are si!.rn=>mrmr-nnrur,...,..,ll-n: 





Barriers inhibiting investment in energy 
efficiency • government level 
• The organisational structure of the DME does not 
support energy efficiency 
• Resource constraints limit the priority list of DME and the 
Government 
• DME's past experience with public agencies has not 
been entirely happy (twice-bitten, thrice-shy) 
• Light-handed regulatory approach is still to require 
require DSM perlormance 
Energy & Oevolopment Research Centre OSM andESiresuucturing 
Preliminary recommendations to DME 
• Giving energy efficiency •serious' attention as 
recommended by South Africa's White Paper on 
Energy Policy 
• This is important if the Government is to been seen to 
be a credible leader in the energy efficiency arena. 
• Given limited resouces, Government must create an 
"enabling environment" that attracts private sector 
investment and involvement in the area. 
OSM and ESI rll!llructi.Dlg 
Preliminary recommendations to the DME 
• Establishing 'serious· DME capacity to give strategic 
direction to energy efficiency priorities, co-ordinate 
governmental activities, monitor & evaluate 
initiatives, as well as develop and enforce DME's 
policy positions 
• A champion or office for energy efficiency is vital, it 
energy efficiency is to earnestly remain on 
Government's agenda 
DSM ~ESireslructurlng 
Preliminary recommendations to the DME 
• Supporting the IEP consultancy project and ensuring 
that skills are transferred to the DME 
• The DME should take care to ensure that (i) the current 
IEP consultancy project is integrated into the DME's 
planning processes, and that (ii) once the consulting 
team has completed its tasks, there are adequate skills 
and know-how within the DME to continue (and grow) 
the process. 
DSM andESirutructurlng 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
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Preliminary recommendations to DME 
• Giving NER directive and committing support 
(resources and other) to implement policies in White 
Paper on Energy Policy 
• International experience demonstrates that regulatory 
tools are probably the most powertul public sector 
means of promoting energy-efficiency investment 
• Government and the NER play complementary roles in 
promoting energy efficency and must work closely 
together in this area. 




Preliminary recommendations to the DME 
• Developing and enforcing codes and standards 
• Complementary to regulatory efforts to ensure 
investment in (public benefit) energy efficiency 
investment, Government must continue work (e.g. 
"SAEDES" and "Minimum Norms and Standards for 
Low-Cost Housing") on codes and standards 
• These are important tools, and will become even more 
so as more competition is introduced into the power 
sector 
OSM andESirestrudlrlig 
Preliminary recommendations to the DME 
• Establishing a National Energy Efficiency Agency 
• The NEEA should focus on protecting public-benefit 
energy efficiency investments (like training, education 
and awareness programmes, demonstrations etc.). 
• Its focus should also be on policy implementation. and 
wide-scale industry co-ordination activities. 
• The NEEA should be given independent status and 
utility/private sector bias should be avoided. 
• The NEEA should support relevant regulatory activities 
• Given government resource constraints, international 
and/or private sector funding should be secured 
EMrli1'f & Oevltlopmanl Ae~an:ll Cenlnt OSM 11ndESirftfructl6ing 
Key decisions for DME 
• Is energy efficiency a real priority of the South African 
Government? 
• can the South African government afford to support 
energy efficiency? 
DSM and ESI rnuud'"'o 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
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Key decisions for DME 
• Should DME create an office/position for energy 
efficiency? 
• Should DME initiate the establishment of a National 
Energy Efficiency Agency to support DME and NER 
efforts? 
• What mechanisms can be employed to ensure effective 
and efficient communication between the NER and 
Government? (thus enhancing complementarity between 
codes/standards, regulatory requirements) 
Energy & Developmenl AI!SO!'!U'Ch Cootm OSM ud ESt '"ructtftlg 
14 
Key decisions for DME 
• What can be done now to ensure that IEP skills remain 
within the DME? 
• Given limited resources, which energy efficiency 
programmes should be prioritised? 
Enervt & Oevelopm!mt Raeardl Centre OSM andESireSiructurlng 
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Recommendations to NER 
Why should the NER support energy efficiency when the 
price of electricity is low, where there is cuffent excess 
capacity, and where good energy efficiency programmes can 
succeed in delaying the market entrance of new IPPs, and 
proposed ESt industry restructuring initiatives? 
... because the NER represents the end-user, and it has been 
proven that energy efficiency reduces the social costs associated 
with producing, delivering and consuming electricity. 
. .. because the whole point of restructuring is to introduce a 
greater degree of economic efficiency into the industry anyway 
... because this is not about either-ors but rather about achieving a 
balance and about good timing (market transformation issues too). 
16 
OSM and ESI mslruct.mg 
Three issues for NER to consider 
• The big DSM investment 'gap' lies in the area of energy 
efficiency (as opposed to other load management 
initiatives) 
• It is important to distinguish between different electricity 
contexts (especially YiithouVwith competition in the retail 
side of the distribution industry) because it is likely that 
different regulatory tools will be needed to support energy 
efficiency in these contexts 
• Regulatory mechanisms are probably the most powertul 
of all tools in promoting energy efficiency investment (i.e. 
approach adopted by the NER will shape the future of 
energy efficiency investment in South Africa) 
39 
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IRP requirements versus DSM requirements 
• By requiring that generation, transmission and distribution 
base investment decisions on principles of IRP does not 
necessarily mean that energy efficiency will be invested in 
(if there is a loop-hole, it will be found) 
• The implication of this is that ff the government and the 
NER are serious about energy efficiency it will probably be 
necessary to ensure that in addition to IRP requirements, 
the NER makes a 'minimal' amount of DSM investment 
requisite of either a license or a particular level of profits. 




Regulatory regimes of the future 
• Currently the NEA bases its decisions on a combination 
of benchmarking exercises, rate-of-return and 
pertormance-based regulation. 
• In new electricity contexts, it is likely that NER 
decisions will be more clearly linked to a pertormance-
based regulatory regime (though until retail competition 
is introduced into the distribution industry it is likely that 
some benchmarking will continue to occur). 
• This all represents good news for DSM and energy 
efficiency as long as supply-side investments are NOT 
concurrently subject to rate-of-return regulation. 
E 1111rgv & D<lvetoprmnl Rese11rch Centra OSM andESiteSiructiA'Ing 
Traditional rate-of-return regulation offers 
bleak prospects for energy efficiency DSM 
• While from a financial perspective this approach may 
often appear to be the best option, it frequently yields 
decisions which are at odds with a socially efficient, 
least-cost planning outcome (i.e. maximising NAB). 
• In its purest sense, this approach does not bcde well for 
energy efficiency investment 
o- It encourages generators to build new capacity and 
distributors to sell more electricity. 
o- It usually allows for the recovery of DSM programme costs 
but doesn't allow for the recovery of lost revenue and lost 
earnings opportunities) 
Ener171' & Development Resean:h Centro OSM 11rtd ESI rntrucllritg 
Traditional performance-based regulation is 
still not enough ... 
• To regulate the monopoly elements of the electricity 
industry, regulators often use a pertormance-based price 
cap formula (e.g. CPI -X where "CPI" is the level of 
inflation and "X" is an incentive factor which regulated 
utilities must recover by increasing efficiency or lowering 
costs). 
• Like rate-of-return regulation, this approach generally 
incentivises distributors to maximise sales (reducing fixed 
costs etc) 
• This approach also disincentivises energy efficiency 
investment (energy efficiency programmes generally resuh 
in a high loss of margin) 
Ener~r~&OftvelopmuniR~Centn~ OSM andESIMM.ICtlmg 




Performance-based regulation with 
"additions" offer hope for energy efficiency (i) 
Instead of allowing profits to rise with sales, regulators 
can: 
o partially or fully decouple sales from profits (i.e. the 
volume-related element of the revenue allowed through 
the price cap can be minimally or significantly reduced). 
Decou piing allows revenues to growth with other factors 
that are independent of changes in actual electricity use. 
It also ensures that actual revenues exactly match an 
established revenue requirement, regardless of sales 
level (through balancing accounts). 
DSM and ESI raslrudumg 
Performance-based regulation with 
"additions" offer hope for energy efficiency (ii) 
Instead of allowing profits to rise with sales, regulators can 
also: 
o compensate utilities for changes in revenues associated 
with energy efficiency programmes. This can be done 
through "net lost revenue adjustment" mechanisms (which 
usually take account of lost energy and lost capacity 
revenues) 
Decoupling • large DSM programmes, regulator has limited 
staff, big diffs between retail price and short-term costs 
NLRAs - small programmes, small diffs between retail price 
and short tenn costs 
DSM andESiresiNtllrtlg 
Performance-based regulation with "additions" 
offer hope for energy efficiency (iii) 
• To support mechanisms (i) or (ii), regulators publish 
standards of pertormance to stipulate what level of energy 
savings distributor utilities should achieve (e.g. 0.5% of 
distributed energy). 
• These standards are seen to be important because even 
though mechanisms (i) and (ii) may be in place, distributors 
generally tend not to take up the opportunity if they do not 
have to. 
• Initially, synergy with benchmarking exercises 
• To be of any consequence, these standards need to be 
supported and enforced (an important function of a NEEA, or 
a role of the NER, or a balance of the two) 
OSM 1111dESI'"'ruclurlng 
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Light-handed regulatory approach 
• An alternative to rate-of-return regulation or to 
pertormance-based regulation is a light-handed regulatory 
approach. This approach should probably then apply to all 
aspects of the electricity industry (otherwise energy 
efficiency will suffer) 
• According to this approach the NER or government may 
require, through legislation or minimal regulation 
distributors to undertake a minimal amount of DSM 
investment (i.e subject distributors to standards of 
pertormance, and compensation maybe) 
• NER should expect that only a minimal amount of 
investment will occur. 
DSM and ESI riiSI:ruci\Rlg 
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Funding options for DSM 
• Either. the NER can allow for the full or partial recovery of 
costs associated with DSM. It could do this through: 
:::. offering net lost revenue adjustment mechanisms 
::> decoupling sales from revenues 
:::. introducing a system-wide 'wires-charge' (kWhs) 
::> introducing a distribution charge (fixed per customer) 
::> applying for a general purpose tax 
• Or. the NER can allow distributors to profit 'slightly' from 
these energy efficiency investments. In addition to the above: 
::> shared savings schemes 
::> bonus mechanisms 
Energy & Development Research Genlnt 






Enforcing DSM requirements ... ? 
• Depends on regulatory regime (heavy- or light· 
handed?) 
• Squeezing profits (potentially adding an additional 
disincentive to undertake energy efficiency investment) 
;:> increasing the efficiency factor (X) or adding a new one 
(E) (i.e. CPI·X·E) 
::> reducing allowed profitv (broader approach) 
• Threatening withdrawal of licence 
::> probably unrealistic 
• Retaining services of proposed NEEA. or establishing 
in-house capacity 
El>l'rgy&.O...vatopmemResearchCenlnt DSM andESirestrudllring 
Links with government initiatives 
• Establishment (or not) of a NEEA will have significant 
implications for the NER 
o NEEA could take strain off NER and govemment in 
terms of dedicating resources towards giving integrated 
and strategic direction in this area, providing NER with a 
mechanism to verity energy efficiency requirements, and 
support distributors undertaking mandatory energy 
efficiency programmes, identifying the gaps etc. 
o If NEEA is not established, and NER requires some 
energy efficiency investment, it will have to find another 
way of enforcing/supporting the initiative ... 
OSM and ESI r~rucltR!g 
Summary of energy efficiency options 
•Now 
o Eskom is asking NER for support for a large energy efficiency 
programme (adjustment in tariff to recover lost revenues 
assodated with Ell, to make initiative revenue nuetral in short 
term). This may be a good opportunity to investigate future 
regulatory mechanisms and funding options ... (pilot approach?) 
o Other distributors are not seriously investing in energy efficiency 
o If NER chooses to support this energy efficiency investment, 
playing field should be level for all (i.e. anyone can participate) 
o Given financial status of some municipalities it is unclear that 
any stipulations should be currentty, though an enabling 
environment must begin to be established 
OSM andESirestrvcf\J1ng 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
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Summary of options 
• Rationalisation of REDs 
.::::> appropriate opportunity to introduce minimum energy efficiency 
requirements (tried and tested!) 
o full spectrum of regulatory mechanisms and funding options 
available (two types of retrospective tariff adjustments as well as 
various system-wide charges) 
o benchmarking exercises to simulate rompetition in distribution, 
value-added energy efficiency product may contribute towards 
good customer service 
o option to establish NEEA 
• Wholesale competition 
o consolidation of above, though 'threat' looms .. 
Energy & Oevelopmanl Re!lllarch Centre DSM andESireslrudurlng 
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Summary of options 
• Retail competition 
31 
o Spectrum of regulatory mechanisms narrows significantly 
because retail business in distribution industry is no longer 
regulated but is where energy efficiency investments tend to be 
initiated 
o Non-bypassable systems benefit charge is the most obvious 
option. Proceeds collected by utilities and fmwarded to NER for 
redistribution either to be adminstered by utilities or an 
independent organisation 
o This is where benefits of a NEEA can be fully appreciated 
(but establish before this time ... ) 
Eoorvt & Oewlopm9nl RI!SIIarch Centre OSM and ESl reslrucllli'Wig 
Key decisions for the NER 
1. Nature of regulatory regime? 
2. Require minimal energy efficiency investment in 
addition to IRP obligations? 
3. How to enforce this? 
4. Allow utilities to recover costs associated with DSM? 
5. Allow utilities to profit from energy efficiency 
programmes? 
6. How to link in with government initiatives and 
directives? 
41 
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Electricity industry restructuring and 
implications for investments in DSM 
• International review 
• Barriers inhibiting investment in DSM in South Africa 
• ESI scenarios and implications for DSM 
• Recommendations to government NER and Eskom 
• Funding options for DSM 
• Synthesis 
Eneruv & Oevclopmcnl Research Ccntro OSM and ESt restructuring 
Industry-wide recommendations on positioning 
DSM in new electricity industry contexts 
• Recommendations to government (creating enabling 
environment, areas of prioirity, institutional framework) 
• Recommendations toNER (regulatory regime and 
regulatory mechanisms) 
• Recommendations to Eskom (and municipalities) 
(reducing barriers) 
E r.rgy & Development AHearch Centre OSM and ESt resructumg 
"Top-down" planning approach versus a 
"bottom-up" approach 
@@·-·· -· ~ _ .... ®. .. " .... 
@@·-···-·-·····-· 
• implications of this are significant for govt. NER and 
Eskom/municipalities (or REDs) 
Energy & Clo!wltopment ~arch Centre DSM andESirestructlrtlg 
Recommendations to government 
• Giving energy efficiency 'serious' attention as 
recommended by White Paper (i.e. creating an "enabling 
environment" for national energy efficiency investment) 
Giving NER directive and committing support (resources 
and other) to implement policies in White Paper 
• Establishing 'serious' DME capacity to give strategic 
direction to energy efficiency priority, monitor & evaluate 
initiatives, as well as enforce policy position 
Establishing a National Energy Efficiency Agency 
(NEEA) (agency could also took at water efficiency) 
OSMandESiresfrudurtng 





Recommendations to NER 
Why should the NER support energy efficiency wllen the 
price of electricity is low. wllere there is cuffent excess 
capacity, and wllere good energy efficiency programmes can 
succeed in delaying the market entrance of new IPPs, and 
proposed ESI industry restructuring initiatives? 
... because the NEA represents the end-user, and it has been 
proven that energy efficiency reduces the social costs associated 
with producing, delivering and consuming electricity . 
.. . because the whole point of restructuring is to introduce a 
greater degree of economic efficiency into the industry anyway 
... because this is not about either-ors but rather about achieving a 
balance and about good timing (market transformation issues too). 
EIWirgy & Developmenr Research cenrre OSM andESire5truc1llflng 
Three issues for NER to consider 
• The big DSM investment 'gap' lies in the area of energy 
efficiency (as opposed to other load management 
initiatives) 
• It is important to distinguish between different electricity 
contexts (especially withouVwith competition in the retail 
side of the distribution industry) because it is likely that 
different regulatory tools will be needed to support energy 
efficiency in these contexts 
• Regulatory mechanisms are probably the most powerlul 
of all tools in promoting energy efficiency investment (i.e. 
approach adopted by the NER will shape the future of 
enerw efficiency investment in South Africa) 
Enmgy & Cklvelopm~nl AHIIIII!:h Cllll!re DSY and ESI rostruclurlng 
IRP requirements versus DSM requirements 
• By requiring that generation, transmission and distribution 
base investment decisions on principles of IRP does not 
necessarily mean that energy efficiency will be invested in 
(if there is a loop-hole, it will be found) 
• The implication of this is that ff the government and the 
NER are serious about energy efficiency it will probably be 
necessary to ensure that In addition to IRP requirements, 
the NER makes a 'minimal' amount of DSM investment 
requisite of either a license or a particular level of profits. 
• It may even transpire that the tAP requirements are too 
difficult to achieve and that minimal DSM becomes a 
second-best alternative. 
OSM nnd ESI r~ruclufing 
Regulatory regimes of the future 
• Currently the NER bases its decisions on a combination 
of benchmarking exercises, rate-of-return and 
perlormance-based regulation. 
• In new electricity contexts, it is likely that NER 
decisions will be more clearly linked to a perlormance-
based regulatory regime {though until retail competition 
is introduced into the distribution industry it is likely that 
some benchmarking will conti.nue to occur). 
• This all represents good news for DSM and energy 
efficiency as long as supply-side investments are NOT 
concurrently subject to rate-of-return regulation. 
OSM andESII'Mtt\ldtl'lr!g 
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Traditional rate-of-return regulation offers 
bleak prospects for energy efficiency DSM 
• While from a financial perspective this approach may 
often appear to be the best option, it frequently yields 
decisions which are at odds with a socially efficient, 
least-cost planning outcome (i.e. maximising NAB). 
• In its purest sense, this approach does not bode well for 
energy efficiency investment 
:J It encourages generators to build new capacity and 
distributors to sell more electricity. 
::> It usually allows for the recovery of OSM programme costs 
but doesn't allow for the recovery of lost revenue and lost 
earnings opportunities) 




Traditional performance-based regulation is 
still not enough ... 
• To regulate the monopoly elements of the electricity 
industry, regulators often use a pertormance-based price 
cap formula (e.g. CPI ·X where "CPI" is the level of 
inflation and "X"' is an incentive factor which regulated 
utilities must recover by increasing efficiency or lowering 
costs). 
• Like rate-of-return regulation, this approach generally 
incentivises distributors to maximise sales (reducing fixed 
costs etc) 
• This approach also disincentivises energy efficiency 
investment (energy efficiency programmes generally result 
in a high loss of margin) 
Energy & OlM!Ioprnll'n\ Research Cel'ltre OSM andESirestructlD!g 
Performance-based regulation with 
"additions" offer hope for energy efficiency (i) 
Instead of allowing profits to rise with sales, regulators 
can: 
:> partially or fully decouple sales from profits (i.e. the 
volume-related element of the revenue allowed through 
the price cap can be minimally or sign~icantly reduced). 
Decou piing allows revenues to growth with other factors 
that are independent of changes in actual electricity use. 
It also ensures that actual revenues exactly match an 
established revenue requirement, regardless of sales 
level (through balancing accounts). 
Energy & Oevelopmenl Reseiii'Ch Cenrre OSM andESirutrtJ:tUI'Ing 
Performance-based regulation with 
"additions" offer hope for energy efficiency (ii) 
Instead of allowing profits to rise with sales, regulators can 
also: 
.:;; compensate utilities for changes in revenues associated 
with energy efficiency programmes. This can be done 
through "net lost revenue adjustment" mechanisms (which 
usually take account of lost energy and lost capacity 
revenues) 
Decoupling - large DSM programmes, regulator has limited 
staff, big diffs between retail price and short~term costs 
NLRAs • small programmes, small diffs between retail price 
and short term costs 
Ene'9Y' & Oeve!opment ReSNfeh c.mr. OSM .ndESir.-ruct~rt~g 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
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Performance-based regulation with "additions" 
offer hope for energy efficiency (iii) 
• To support mechanisms (i) or (ii), regulators publish 
standards of pertonnance to stipulate what level of energy 
savings distributor utilities should achieve (e.g. 0.5% of 
distributed energy). 
• These standards are seen to be important because even 
though mechanisms (i) and (ii) may be in place, distributors 
generally tend not to take up the opportunity ~they do not 
have to. 
• Initially, synergy with benchmarking exercises 
• To be of any consequence, these standards need to be 
supported and enforced (an important function of a NEEA. or 
a role of the NER, or a balance of the two) 
Energy & Developmunl Rnean::h cetllre OSM and ESI resuuclumg 
14 
Light-handed regulatory approach 
• An alternative to rate-of-return regulation or to 
pertormance·based regulation is a light-handed regulatory 
approach. This approach should probably then apply to all 
aspects of the electricity industry (otherwise energy 
efficiency will suffer) 
• According to this approach the NER or government may 
require, through legislation or minimal regulation 
distributors to undertake a minimal amount of DSM 
investment (i.e subject distributors to standards of 
performance, and compensation maybe) 
• NER should expect that only a minimal amount of 
investment will occur. 
Energy & Develaprmnl Research Cenlre OSM alldESirestructlMing 
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Funding options for DSM 
• Either, the NER can allow for the full or partial recovery of 
costs associated with DSM. It could do this through: 
o offering net lost revenue adjustment mechanisms 
o decoupling sales from revenues 
o introducing a system-wide 'wires-charge' (kWhs) 
o introducing a distribution charge (fixed per customer) 
::> applying for a general purpose tax 
• Or, the NER can allow distributors to profit 'slightly' from 
these energy efficiency investments. In addition to the above: 
16 
o shared savings schemes o mark-up mechanisms 
o bonus mechanisms o others .... 
OSM and ESI reslructlrtlg 
Enforcing DSM requirements ... ? 
• Depends on regulatory regime (heavy- or light· 
handed?) 
• Squeezing profits (potentially adding an additional 
disincentive to undertake energy efficiency investment) 
o increasing the efficiency factor (X) or adding a new one 
(E) (i.e. CPI·X·E) 
o reducing allowed profitv (broader approach) 
• Threatening withdrawal of licence 
o probably unrealistic 
• Retaining services of proposed NEEA, or establishing 
in-house capacity 
OSM and ESI restrudtmg 
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Links with government initiatives 
• Establishment (or not) of a NEEA will have signHicant 
implications for the NER 
c:> NEEA could take strain off NER and government in 
terms of dedicating resources towards giving integrated 
and strategic direction in this area. providing NER with a 
mechanism to verify energy efficiency requirements, and 
support distributors undertaking mandatory energy 
efficiency programmes. identifying the gaps etc. 
c:> If NEEA Is not established, and NER requires some 
energy efficiency Investment, It will have to find another 
way of enforcing/supporting the initiative ... 
Summary of energy efficiency options 
•Now 
19 
==· Eskom is asking NER for support for a large energy efficiency 
programme {adjustment in tariff to recover lost revenues 
associated with Ell, to make initiative revenue nuetral in short 
term). This may be a good opportunity to investigate future 
regulatory mechanisms and funding options ... (pilot approach?) 
o Other distributors are not seriousty investing in energy efficiency 
c:> If NER chooses to support this energy efficiency Investment. 
playing field should be level for all (i.e. anyone can participate) 
c::> Given financial status of some municipalities it is undear that 
any stipulations should be currently, though an enabling 
environment must begin to be established 
OSMandESI~ 
Summary of options 
• Rat1onahsat•on of REDs 
c:> appropriate opponunity to introduce minimum energy efficiency 
requirements (tried and tested!) 
c::> full spectrum of regulatory mechanisms and funding options 
available (two types of retrospective tariff adjustments as well as 
various system·wide charges) 
c::- benchmaric:ing exercises to simulate competition in distribution. 
value-added energy efficiency product may contribute towards 
good customer service 
c:' option to establish NEEA 
• Wholesale competition 
~ consolidation of above. though 'threat' looms ... 
20 
Summary of options 
• Retail competition 
Q Spectrum of regulatory mechanisms narrows significantry 
because retail business in distribution industry is no longer 
regulated but is where energy efficiency investments tend to be 
initiated 
c:> Non·bypassable systems benefit charge Is the most obvious 
option. Proceeds collecled by utilities and forwarded to NER for 
redistribution either to be adminstered by utilities or an 
independent organisation 
c:> This Is where benefits ol a NEEA can be fully appreciated 
(but establish belore this time ... ) 
OSM.nctESI~ 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
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Key decisions for the NER 
1. Nature of regulatol)l regime? 
2. Require minimal energy efficiency investment in 
add~ion to IRP obligations? 
3. How to enforce this? 
4. Allow utilities to recover costs associated with DSM? 
5. Allow utilities to profit from energy efficiency 
programmes? 
6. How to link in with government initiatives and 
directives? 
44 





Presentation: International review and lessons for 
South Africa 
Making provision for energy efficiency 
investment in changing electricity markets: 
International perspectives 
• Allx Clark 
Energy and Development Research Centre 
~---------------- ""'-
Presentation outline 
• DSM/ESI research project 
• Importance of focused research and recommendations 
• Energy industry dynamics 
• Overview of impact of power sector reform on pltllic-benefit 
energy efficiency investment 
• Rationale for efforts to invest in public-benefit energy efficiency 
programmes 
• Overview of international efforts to protect public-benefit energy 
efficiency investment 
• Lessons for South Africa and other countries 
1.----------------- """. 
• International review 
• Barriers Inhibiting investment in DSM in South Africa 
• Possible impacts of restructuring the electricity supply industry 
onOSM 
• Possible mechanisms and strategies to position OSM well in a 
restructured electricity industry 
• Funding options for OSM in a restructured electricity industry 





The· DSM & :Eshestiuctiuing res.earcb project 
(II) 
.................. ··········································· 
In most other parts of the world, power sector restructuring has 
resuned in significant declines in investment in OSM 
• As the South African ESI restructures, what will happen to OSM here? 
• How can we seek to protect OSM investments that yield significant 
national benefits but are threatened by pending restructuring 
processes? 
······················.·····-············-·······.······-··························-························. 
The more fo.cused the roisearch, debates and .4lf,..-
......... re<:<>~·ll~~~'<>IJ"·ttt"~ett"."r .................... ~ 
The international review indicates that OSM investments fall into two 
broad categories: 
• those which are in utilities 
financial interests to 
undertake (load shifting, 
interruptlblllty, strategic 
growth and some energy 
efficiency programmes) 
• those which are NOT in 
utilities financial interests 
to undertake (public-
benefit energy efficiency 
programmes) 
Energy efficiency 
F:""'~C'«'i"flr. .. t-g::flt:C 
Str.:~taglc growth (>v.'•Jit! t.<<X<cf'i ~.~.-~tr.o«-1 
I8IIAI 
Different approaches apply! 
~--------------- ······-
In developing an understanding of how to ensure adequate future 
energy efficiency investment, the international review has highlighted 
the importance of taking into account: 
• different electricity industry restructuring mooers 
AND ... 
• different developmental stages of energy services industries. 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
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11 
s-;;~~;;b-j~t;;;~., ;~~ht t~ p~otect pubii~-
benefit energy efficiency Investments while 
·others have not 
····························'················'··='·'·'·'····························· 
Rationale for efforts in this area: 
• to protect the interests of power sector customers; 
• to achieve energy-environment policy goals and commitments 
• to defer decisions for new power sector investments 
• to make a real contribution to the economy 
• to ifllJrove customer service and to retain/expand upon customer 
base. 
12 
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• Regulatory measlKes 
• Financing mechanisms 





• Some utilities have required utilities to undertake a minimum amount 
of public benefit energy efficiency investment (England and Wales. 
US and Norway). Indeed, a MINIMAL amount of investment has been 
made! 
• Most utilities have sought to complementlsupport these mandatory 
requirements with other regulatory measures (like decoupling sales 
from revenues, allowing utilities to recover los1 revenues through 'lost 
revenue adjustment mechanisms', and gtving the mandate to 
independent public agencies to support/promote energy efficiency 
investment) 
..................... : .... : ..... ~~~~-~--~~~~-~~ 
Most regulators have been faced with the decision as to whether to allow 
utilities to partially or fully recover the costs associated with public· 
purpose energy efficiency programmes, and/or whether to allow utilities 
to profit from these lnitatives 
Jti.I~ijjf~l~tN@I&i]ltifN9JW:ii} Utilities are permitted to recover the 
cost of such programmes and in some cases lost revenues. 
$1:i7Q#~~~ In the past, utilities were permitted to recover lost 
revenues and costs as well as earn a reasonable profit on 
programmes (thus creating a level playing field with supply·side 
investments) 
....__ _________ '""" 
46 
Promoting public benefit energy-efficiency investment in new power context 
15 
To enable utilities to recover costs and lost revenues, utmties have 
adopted various financing mechanisms: 
:~';\ttjiti@~Si 
Until recently, utilities were allowed to recover lost revenues 
through lost revenue adjustment mechanisms or through 
decoupling mechanisms. 
More recently, non by-passable system-wide benefits surcharges 
(based either on usage, demand or a combination of the two) 
Shared-savings, bonus and mark-up mechanisms are used to 
calculate utilities' allowed profits 
'-------------':::,,·, 
16 
·_:;~,• ::£ngiS_n4 arid W~les: Offer introduced a special revenue allowance to 
be used by REGs to achieve energy savings on behalf of customers 
19 
20 
• Indications are beginning to emerge that if 'reasonable' levels of 
energy efficiency are to be invested in, then it is most likely that 
regulatory provisions, financing mechanisms and independent 
support are all necessary. 
• Countries where these three functions have not all existed are 
beginning to make provision for them (examples: New Zealand and 
United States). 
Utility lnl•rut ESCO •cUvtty 
(1 pound over 4 years) lltltttvEscos 
•':··::~-~~;ty:- Energy efficiency investment is funded by a OSM wires or 
distribution charge (0.0002 NOK/kWh) 




In many countries, governments or power sector regulators have chosen 
to establish lndapendant agencies to champion energy efficiency. The 
mandate and outreach of these independent energy efficiency agencies 
varies 
:':·-;.:= )~e~Zeii:i~[k Utilities are not obliged to invest in energy efficiency. 
Rather, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority is 
responsible tor designing and implementing energy efficiency and 
conservation strategies and programmes.EECA is funded by 
government 
•.". ·e':'oQI~iKf9:~W.~1$$~.0ffer has retained the Energy Savings Trust to 
··· ··· assist AE:Cs in deSi.Qning and implementing energy efficiency 
programmes. EST negotiates wtth Offer and AECs to set each 
companies energy savings targets. evaluates projects and manages 
national projects. EST is funded by government 
L-------------- '·"'' 
18 
In many countries. governments or power sector regulators have chosen 
to establish independent agancies to champion energy efficiency. The 
mandate/outreach of these agencies varies: 
e: ·:Norwl~: REECs have been established by NVE to undertake energy 
·efficiency programmes on distributors behalf. REECs are funded 
through the wires charge. 
-~·~:·~-·T~~ Established by the government and the Private Enterprise 
· ·· · ·FoUndation, the Energy Foundation seeks to promote sustainable 
development through customer education, policy advocacy, 
strengthening private sector participation and undertaking R&D 
tJoL'Iiiiliit PROCEL was established by government(?) and is mandated 
to carry out R&D, demonstrations, education and training, 
development of legislation, market transfonnation, design and 
implementation of energy effiCiency investments. 
L-------------------- ~~t.i": 






Does this have something to do with different dimensions of change? 
.. ·········L~;~~~;-~~;·sA·~d ~lsewhere 
- .. ············-··· 
• The public sector's role in encouraging pubhc-benehl energy 
efficiency investment is essential 
• Rules of the game should be established pnor to restructunng and 
should be right from the start 
• It is not clear whether utilities should contmue to admtmster pubhc 
benefit energy efficiency programmes 
• Secured funding and independence are crit1ca1 success factors tor 
agencies/programmes dedicated to promottng plbhc benefit energy 
efficiency investment 
• While playing important roles in energy serviCe 1ndustnes. pnvale 
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